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Abstract
We analyze the impact of the skill-biased immigration influx that took place
during the years 2000-2009 in the United States, within a search and matching
model that allows for skill heterogeneity, differential search cost between immigrants
and natives, capital-skill complementarity and possibly endogenous skill acquisition.
Within such a framework, we find that although the skill-biased immigration raised
the overall net income to natives, it may have had distributional effects. Specifically,
unskilled native workers gained in terms of both employment and wages. Skilled
native workers, on the other hand, gained in terms of employment but may have
lost in terms of wages. Nevertheless, in one extension of the model, where skilled
workers and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, we find that even the skilled wage
may have risen.
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1 Introduction
The impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes in the host country has long
been a subject of debate among economists. The results provided by a large number
of careful empirical studies on this subject are often contradictory. For example, Borjas
(2003) and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) find a large negative wage effect on natives,
whereas Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find this effect to be relatively small
and often positive. Among the key issues behind this disagreement is the elasticity of
substitution between native and immigrants in the same skill group. In particular, as it
is now well understood, imperfect substitution between native and immigrant labor can
generate a positive effect on native wages.
This paper aspires to contribute to the debate regarding the impact of immigration
by following a different approach. We conduct our analysis within a model that belongs
to the general family of search and matching models of the labor market (e.g., Diamond,
1982 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). In this class of models, unemployment exists
due to search frictions and job entry responds endogenously to the incentives provided
by the market. Thus, contrary to the competitive paradigm, our approach allows for the
analysis of the unemployment and wage effects that come from the impact of changes in
the availability of jobs on the bargaining position of workers.
In addition, our baseline model has the following key features. First, it allows for
the presence differential search costs between natives and immigrants, which, besides
adding further realism to the model, is a key factor in explaining the equilibrium wage
gap between otherwise identical native and immigrant workers. This feature generates
also the possibility that immigration improves the employment and wage prospects of
competing natives, since immigrants, who have a lower outside option, are willing to
accept lower wages. Hence, an immigration influx lowers the average wage that firms
expect to pay, leading to more job entry and consequently a better bargaining position
for native workers. Second, we incorporate in the search set-up heterogeneity in terms
of skills among native workers as well as between natives and immigrants. This allows
us to analyze the distributional effects of immigration on different skill groups. Third,
the presence of capital as an independent factor of production serves as an additional
channel of adjustment to immigration-induced changes in labor supply. Fourth, our model
adopts a generalized production technology that allows for the analysis of the impact of
immigration under different assumptions regarding the degrees of capital-skill, within-skill
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and across-skill complementarity.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and find that the impact of the skill-
biased increase in immigration that took place in the period 2000-2009 is positive on
the overall net income to natives. As expected, it lowers the unemployment and raises
the wage rate of unskilled native workers. This occurs for two reasons. First, skill-biased
immigration influx raises the marginal product of unskilled labor and second, the entrance
of unskilled immigrants lowers the expected employment cost, owing to the lower wages
paid to immigrants, and encourages unskilled job entry. However, we also find that it
encourages skilled job entry, leading to a smaller unemployment rate for skilled workers
as well. The increase in skilled job entry is also due to firms anticipating that, with a
higher number of skilled immigrants searching for jobs, they will have to pay lower wages
on average. As regards the wage of skilled native workers, on the one hand, the higher
availability of skilled jobs strengthens their bargaining position and pushes their wage up,
but, on the other, the fall in their marginal product, due to the relatively higher quantity
of skilled labor, causes their wage to fall. In our baseline calibration we let immigrants
and natives of the same skill type be perfect substitutes in production and find the overall
impact on the wage of skilled natives to be negative. However, once we allow for a lower
degree of substitutability between natives and immigrants, we find the impact on skilled
natives to be positive not only in terms of unemployment but also in terms of wages.
We also extend the model to examine the case when the immigration influx is skill-
balanced, i.e., the skill distribution does not change, as well as when immigrants and
natives of the same type search in different markets or, put in a different way, firms can
direct their search effort towards workers of the same skill type but of different origin.
Finally, we compare the results under the assumption that the proportion of skilled na-
tive workers is fixed to those obtained when the proportion of skilled natives responds
endogenously to immigration-induced changes in the relative supply of skills. We view
this comparison as being crucial in distinguishing between the short-run and the long-run
effects of immigration.
Although there is a vast empirical literature on this topic, the number of theoretical
studies that analyze immigration within a dynamic general equilibrium framework is rela-
tively small. Furthermore, most of them employ the standard neoclassical growth model;
examples include, but are not limited to, Hazari and Sgro (2003), Ben-Gad (2004, 2008),
Moy and Yip (2006), and Palivos (2009). To the best of our knowledge, the only other
2
papers that analyze immigration within a framework that allows for labor market search
frictions are those of Ortega (2000) and Liu (2010). The former considers a two-country
model where workers decide whether to search in their own country or immigrate. He
shows that Pareto-ranked multiple steady-state equilibria may arise with or without im-
migration. Ortega’s analysis also takes into account the positive impact of immigration
on job entry due to firms anticipating that they will pay lower wages to immigrants that
have higher search costs. However, the model in Ortega (2000) assumes that worker pro-
ductivity is constant and therefore independent of immigration influx. Moreover, in his
framework there is only one labor type. Thus, his analysis overlooks both the negative
competition effects on the marginal product of native workers and the across-skill exter-
nalities that arise when otherwise identical natives and immigrants compete for the same
types of jobs.
Liu (2010) concentrates on the welfare effects of illegal immigration within a dynamic
general equilibrium model with search frictions. The presence of search frictions allows
him to identify a new channel through which immigration can alter domestic consumption:
intensified job competition from illegal immigrants lowers the job finding rate of native
workers and forces them to accept lower wages. Our model is closer to an extended version
of his baseline model, where there are two types of domestic labor in constant numbers,
namely, skilled and unskilled, and illegal immigrants belong to the unskilled group. Thus,
unlike Liu (2010), who considers only illegal and hence unskilled immigration, we look at
the effects of total immigration during the period 2000-2009, which according to the data
is skill-biased. In addition, the existence of different outside options (search costs) between
natives and immigrants in our framework allows us to capture the effect of immigration
on job entry through its impact on expected employment costs.
As regards the production technology, the main difference between our model and
Liu’s extended model is that we employ a nested CES aggregator that allows for skilled
labor to be more complimentary to capital than unskilled labor, whereas Liu assumes a
Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies that the two types of labor are equally
complementary to capital. Furthermore, Liu’s extended model assumes that immigrants
and natives are perfect substitutes in production, while we also explore the case of im-
perfect substitutability between the two labor types. Our assumptions regarding the
production technology are closer to those of Ben-Gad (2008), who analyzes a neoclassical
growth model with overlapping dynasties and two types of labor, but does not allow for
3
search frictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model.
Section 3 defines the steady-state equilibrium and analyzes its existence and uniqueness.
In Section 4, we analyze two special cases of the model. In the first, we assume that
there are no differences in search costs between otherwise identical native and immigrant
workers. In the second, we assume differential search costs, but let the two labor inputs
(skilled and unskilled) be perfect substitutes to each other. Considering these two cases
separately allows us to identify two different channels through which immigration can
affect labor market outcomes: one that comes from the impact on firms’ expected cost of
establishing an employment relation and one that comes from the impact on the prices
of labor inputs. In Section 5 we calibrate the model and present simulation results in the
general case when both of these channels are present. In Section 6 we extend the basic
model in four different ways by allowing for skill-balanced immigration, imperfect substi-
tutability within skill groups, endogenous skill acquisition and separate labor markets for
natives and immigrants. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks. There are also three
Appendices, named A, B and C (all available upon request), which provide detailed proofs
of the propositions, perform an extensive sensitivity analysis of our results and present
the dynamic adjustment of the equilibrium.
2 The Basic Model
We construct a search and matching model with two intermediate inputs and one final
consumption good. Time is continuous and begins at t = 0. The economy is populated
by a continuum of workers and a continuum of jobs. Workers are either natives (N) or
immigrants (I). The mass of natives is normalized to unity, while that of immigrants
is denoted by I and is determined exogenously. The mass of jobs, on the other hand,
is determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium. All agents are risk neutral and
discount the future at a common rate r > 0, which is equal to the interest rate. The rest
of this section offers a detailed description of the model; see also Figure 1 for a graphic
presentation of its basic structure.
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2.1 Workers and Firms
Workers are either skilled (H) or unskilled (L).1 Let λ be the fraction of native workers
that are unskilled and 1−λ the fraction of those that are skilled (in the benchmark version
of the model λ is taken as given). Similarly, immigrants are either skilled or unskilled
and their numbers, denoted by IH and IL respectively, are determined exogenously. All
workers are born and die at the rate n.
Our production side borrows some elements from Acemoglu (2001). Firms operate
either in one of the two intermediate sectors or in the final sector. The two intermediate
sectors produce inputs YH and YL using skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. More
specifically, each of these two sectors operates a linear technology, which, through normal-
ization of units, yields output equal to the number of the respective workers employed.
These intermediate inputs are non-storable. Once produced, they are sold in competitive
markets and are immediately used for the production of the final good (Y ).
Next we turn to the final good sector. Motivated by a series of empirical papers
(see, among others, Griliches 1969 and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante 2000),
which support the idea that skilled labor is relatively more complementary to capital than
unskilled labor, we post the following production technology for the final good
Y = [αY ρL + (1− α)Qρ]1/ρ, ρ ≤ 1, (1)
with
Q = [xKγ + (1− x)Y γH ]1/γ, γ ≤ 1, (2)
where K denotes capital, α and x are positive parameters that govern income shares and
ρ and γ drive the elasticities of substitution between capital and the unskilled input and
capital and the skilled input, respectively. Thus, the production function is a two-level
CES function in which capital (K) and the skilled input (YH) are nested together in the
sub-aggregate input Q given by equation (2) and then Q and the unskilled input (YL)
enter the main production function (equation 1). Capital-skill complementarity is defined
as ρ > γ, which implies that an increase in the capital stock raises the skill premium (see,
among others, Krusell et al. 2000 and Polgreen and Silos 2008). If either ρ or γ equals
zero, then the corresponding nesting is Cobb-Douglas.
Since the two intermediate inputs are sold in competitive markets, their prices, pL and
pH , will be equal to their marginal products, that is,
1We use the terms skilled (unskilled) and high- (low-) skill interchangeably.
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pL = αY
ρ−1
L Y
1−ρ, (3)
and
pH = (1− α)(1− x)Y γ−1H Qρ−γY 1−ρ. (4)
We assume that there exists a competitive capital market in which firms can buy
and sell capital without delay. Since the market is competitive, the marginal product of
capital is equal to its rental price (pK), which is in turn equal to the interest rate (r) plus
its depreciation rate (δ). Thus,
pK = (1− α)xKγ−1Qρ−γY 1−ρ = r + δ. (5)
2.2 Search and Matching
We dispense with the Walrasian auctioneer and assume that in each of the two labor
markets unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies are brought together via a stochas-
tic matching technology M(Ui, Vi), where Ui and Vi denote respectively the number of
unemployed workers and vacancies of skill type i, i = H,L. This function M(·) exhibits
standard properties: it is at least twice continuously differentiable, increasing in its ar-
guments, exhibits constant returns to scale and satisfies the familiar Inada conditions.
Using the property of constant returns to scale, we can write the flow rate of a match
for a worker as M(Ui, Vi)/Ui = m(θi) and the flow rate of a match for a vacancy as
M(Ui, Vi)/Vi = q(θi), where θi = Vi/Ui = m(θi)/q(θi) is an indicator of the tightness
prevailing in labor market i. Also, the above-mentioned assumptions on M(·) imply the
following properties for m(·) and q(·):
m′(θi) > 0, lim
θi→0
m(θi) = 0, lim
θi→∞
m(θi) =∞,
q′(θi) < 0, lim
θi→0
q(θi) =∞, and lim
θi→∞
q(θi) = 0.
Firms post either high-skill vacancies, which are suited for skilled workers, or low-skill
vacancies, which are suited for unskilled workers. Each firm posts at most one vacancy
and the number of firms of each type is determined endogenously by free entry. Firms can
choose to open either skilled or unskilled vacancies, but cannot ex-ante open vacancies
suited only for natives or only for immigrants (we relax this assumption in one of the
extensions of the basic model in Section 6). A vacant firm bears a recruitment cost ci,
i = H,L, specific to its type. This is measured in units of final output, which melts away
6
in keeping the vacancy. On the other hand, an unemployed worker of type i receives a
flow of income bi, which can be considered as the opportunity cost of employment. There
is no cross-skill matching. High skill workers direct their search towards the high-skill
sector and low-skill workers towards the low-skill sector. Also, for simplicity, we assume
that creating a vacancy is costless, although this can be easily amended following, for
example, Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995) or Acemoglu (2001).
The instant a vacancy and a worker make contact, they bargain over the division of
any surplus. The skill level of the worker as well as the output that will result from a
match is known to both parties. We assume that wages are determined by an asymmetric
Nash bargaining, where the worker has bargaining power β. After an agreement has
been reached, production commences immediately. Moreover, we assume that matches
dissolve at the rate si, specific to their type. Following a separation, the worker and the
vacancy enter the corresponding market and search for new trading partners should it
prove profitable for them to do so.
In addition, unemployed workers are subject to a per unit of time “search” cost, hij,
which is specific to the worker’s skill type i = H,L, and origin j = N, I, where N denotes
“native” and I denotes “immigrant.” There are several reasons why an immigrant may face
a higher search cost or equivalently a lower income while being unemployed and searching
for a job. In addition to the problems that one may encounter if being in a foreign country
(e.g., lack of a social network, lower language proficiency, etc.), lower income may result
if immigrants do not qualify for the same unemployment insurance benefits as natives.2
More generally, however, hij may denote a difference in the outside option bi. Henceforth,
we assume that hiN = 0 < hiI , i = H,L, implying that an immigrant worker has a lower
outside option than a native who is of the same skill type.
2.3 Asset Value Functions
At any point in time a worker is either employed (E) or unemployed (U). Likewise a
vacancy is either filled (F ) or else is looking for a worker (V ). We denote the present
discounted value associated with each state by Jκij, where the subscript i = H,L denotes
the skill type (high- or low-skill), the subscript j = N, I denotes the origin (native or im-
2Illegal immigrants are often not eligible for any unemployment insurance benefits. Also, in the United
States, for example, legal immigrants qualify for unemployment insurance benefits that are covered by
the state governments and last for 26 weeks. Nevertheless, not all of them qualify for benefits, covered
by the federal government, that extend beyond the 26-week period and are paid during times of recession
(see, for example, NELP 2002).
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migrant), and the superscript κ = V, U, F,E, indicates the state (vacant firm, unemployed
worker, filled job, employed worker). Then in steady state:
rJVi = −ci + q(θi)
[
φiJ
F
iN + (1− φi)JFiI − JVi
]
, (6)
rJFij = pi − wij − (si + n)
[
JFij − JVi
]
, (7)
(r + n)JUij = bi − hij +m(θi)
[
JEij − JUij
]
, (8)
(r + n)JEij = wij − si
[
JEij − JUij
]
, (9)
where φi is the fraction of unemployed workers of skill type i that are natives and hij = 0
if j = N. Also, wij denotes the wage rate for a worker of skill type i = H,L and origin
j = N, I. Expressions such as these have, by now, a familiar interpretation. For instance,
consider equation (6). The term rJVi is the flow value accrued to an unmatched vacancy
of type i: it equals the loss from maintaining a vacant position plus the flow probability
of becoming matched with a worker of the same type multiplied by the expected capital
gain from such an event. The other asset value equations possess similar interpretation.
As there is free entry and exit on the firm side in each intermediate input market, an
additional vacancy of skill type i should make expected net profit equal to zero, that is,
JVi = 0. (10)
2.4 Nash Bargaining
Since all workers and firms are risk neutral, Nash bargaining implies that the wage rate
for a worker of skill type i and origin j, wij, must be such that:
(1− β)(JEij − JUij ) = β(JFij − JVi ). (11)
In other words, firms get a share 1−β and workers get β of the total surplus Sij generated
by a match, where
Sij = J
F
ij + J
E
ij − JUij − JVi ,
that is,
JFij − JVi = (1− β)Sij, (12)
JEij − JUij = βSij. (13)
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2.5 Steady-State Composition of the Labor Force
Recall that IH and IL denote the mass of skilled and unskilled immigrants, respectively.
Thus, the total mass of skilled (unskilled) workers in the economy is 1− λ+ IH (λ+ IL).
Next by equating the flows out of unemployment to the sum of separations and new births,
we can find the steady-state employment, and hence the production of each intermediate
input (see Appendix A for the details):
YH =
m(θH)(1− λ+ IH)
n+ sH +m(θH)
, (14)
YL =
m(θL)(λ+ IL)
n+ sL +m(θL)
. (15)
Similarly, the steady-state unemployment Uij of each type i = H,L and origin j = N, I
is given by:
UHN =
(n+ sH)(1− λ)
n+ sH +m(θH)
, UHI =
(n+ sH)IH
n+ sH +m(θH)
, (16)
ULN =
(n+ sL)λ
n+ sL +m(θL)
, ULI =
(n+ sL)IL
n+ sL +m(θL)
. (17)
Moreover, as mentioned above, the probability that a type i and unemployed worker
is native is denoted by φi and is equal to
φH =
UHN
UH
=
1− λ
1− λ+ IH , (18)
φL =
ULN
UL
=
λ
λ+ IL
, (19)
where Ui = UiN + UiI , i = H,L.
3 Steady-State Equilibrium
Consider next the definition of a steady-state equilibrium for this economy.
Definition. A steady-state equilibrium is a set {θ∗i , p∗i , p∗K , w∗ij, Y ∗i , K∗, U∗ij, }, where
i = L,H and j = N, I, such that
(i) The intermediate input markets clear. In particular, conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied.
(ii) The capital market clears; i.e., condition (5) is satisfied.
(iii) The free entry condition (10) for each skill type i is satisfied.
(iv) The Nash bargaining optimality condition (11) for each skill type i and origin j holds.
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(v) The numbers of employed and unemployed workers as well as of filled and unfilled
vacancies of each type and origin remain constant; i.e., among others, conditions (14)-(17)
are satisfied.
As shown in Appendix A, the steady-state equilibrium values of θH and θL are given
by the following reduced system of equations:
α
{
α + (1− α)
(
AH
ALΛ
)ρ
[xkγ + (1− x)] ργ
} 1−ρ
ρ
= BL, (20)
(1− α) (1− x) [xkγ + (1− x)] 1−γγ
{
α
(
ALΛ
AH
)ρ
[xkγ + (1− x)]− ργ + (1− α)
} 1−ρ
ρ
= BH ,
(21)
where Ai, Λ and k are the employment rate of type i, the ratio of unskilled to skilled
labor and the capital to skilled labor ratio, respectively. They are defined as follows
Ai ≡ m(θi)
n+ si +m(θi)
, Λ ≡ λ+ IL
1− λ+ IH , k ≡
K
YH
=
[
xBH
(1− x)(r + δ)
] 1
1−γ
,
where
Bi ≡ bi − (1− φi)hiI + ci[n+ r + si + βm(θi)]
(1− β)q(θi) , i = L,H.
Each of equations (20) and (21) is a zero expected profit condition in the unskilled
and skilled input market, respectively. The left-hand-side, which equals pi, i = L,H, is
the revenue and the right-hand-side, Bi, the expected cost to an unfilled vacancy of skill
type i from being matched randomly with a worker of the same type.
Recall that (1) and (2) imply diminishing marginal products and Edgeworth comple-
mentarity between two different inputs, that is, ∂pi/∂Yi < 0 and ∂pi/∂Yj > 0 for i 6= j.
Therefore, an increase in θi, which raises the employment and production of input i (Yi),
decreases its price pi (=marginal product). Also, an increase in θi raises the time required
to fill a vacant position of type i and hence increases its expected cost Bi. Thus, if, for ex-
ample, the left-hand-side of (20) is higher than its right-hand-side (i.e., pL > BL), then it
is profitable to post unskilled vacancies and θL increases until the equilibrium is restored.
Finally, an increase in the tightness in market j (θj) raises the employment of input j and
thus leads to a higher price of input i, i 6= j.
Having determined θ∗H and θ
∗
L, we can get the equilibrium values for the other variables
by substituting in the appropriate equations. In particular, the unemployment rates (uij)
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follow from equations (16) to (17); for example, the unemployment rate among skilled
natives, which is equal to the one among skilled immigrants, is given by uHN = uHI =
(n+ sH)/[n+ sH +m(θH)]. Finally, the wage rates are given by (see Appendix A)
wij =
[n+ r + si +m(θi)]βpi + (n+ r + si)(1− β)(bi − hij)
n+ r + si + βm(θi)
. (22)
Note that equation (22) can be written as
wij = (1− β)(r + n)JUij + βpi, (23)
that is, the worker’s wage is a linear combination of his outside option ((r + n)JUij ) and
his marginal product (= pi) (see Appendix A). Therefore, an increase in tightness θi and
thus the matching rate m(θi) has two effects on the wage rate of a worker of type i: one
negative through the price pi - an increase in the matching rate raises employment and
thus decreases the marginal product and price of input i - and one positive through the
outside option - an increase in the matching rate raises the value of search and hence the
outside option, which strengthens the worker’s bargaining position.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness). Under certain parameter restrictions
confined in Appendix A, a steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. All formal proofs are presented in Appendix A.
The essence of Proposition 1 can be captured with the help of Figure 2. The equilibrium
values of θH and θL are given by the intersection of the two curves labeled as EP and
OH. The EP curve results after combining equations (20) and (21) (it is described by
equation A10 given in Appendix A). This curve comprises the set of values of θH and θL
that yield equal profit and make firms indifferent between establishing a high-skill and
a low-skill vacancy. It has a negative slope since an increase in θH lowers the matching
rate for high-skill vacancies (q(θH)) and thus raises the average time it takes to fill one
of them. Put differently, the expected cost of establishing a high-skill vacancy, BH , goes
up, which will decrease the ratio (YH/YL), in order to restore the relation between pH
and BH . The decrease in (YH/YL) will in turn decrease the marginal product of unskilled
labor pL. To offset this, there must be a decrease in the cost of establishing a low-skill
vacancy BL, which requires a decrease in θL.
3
3In general the curvature of the EP locus cannot be determined; we draw it as a straight line for
simplicity.
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The curve OH, on the other hand, is the geometric locus of values of θH and θL
that make the expected profit from establishing a high-skill vacancy equal to zero (it is
described by equation 21).4 It has a positive slope because an increase in θH leads to
a higher expected cost (BH) and a lower price (pH) in the skilled sector. Hence, there
must be an increase in θL, which will raise the price of the high-skill input and restore
the zero-profit condition pH = BH .
Notice from equation (22) that the wage rate of a native worker who is of type i
is higher than that of an immigrant who is of the same skill type. In other words,
firms extract higher surplus from immigrants. Therefore, we need to exclude the case
where a firm that meets a native worker decides not to form an employment relation and
continues to search. As shown in Appendix A, for a meaningful equilibrium where natives
get employed, the following condition must hold:
Condition 1 (Precluding the Option to Wait)
ci
q(θi)
≥ (1− φi)(1− β)hiI
[n+ r + si + βm(θi)]
.
The left-hand side is the average cost of a vacant position of type i while the right-
hand side is the expected net benefit from hiring an immigrant of type i. Condition
1 (written as an equality) establishes the minimum level of market tightness θi for a
meaningful equilibrium. Given equations (12) and (13), the same condition ensures that
JEij ≥ JUij , that is, an unemployed worker will not turn down an employment opportunity
and continue searching.
4 Equilibrium with Search Frictions
In general, a change in the number of skilled or unskilled immigrants Ii, i = H,L, can
influence the equilibrium through the impact of such a change on i) prices pi and ii)
expected employment costs Bi. Before analyzing the equilibrium in the general case,
where a change in Ii is propagated through both of these channels, it is instructive to
examine each case separately. Specifically, we analyze two special cases: first, we set the
immigrant search cost hiI equal to zero, so that there is no difference anymore between a
native and an immigrant worker of the same skill type. In other words, this assumption
implies that wij = wi for each j and hence a firm is indifferent between hiring an immigrant
4Note that we could have used instead the curve along which the expected profit of establishing a
low-skill vacancy is zero, as described by equation (20).
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and a native worker with the same skills. In this case, a change in Ii has no impact on
employment costs Bi; thus, it influences the equilibrium only through its impact on prices.
The second special case that we analyze below is the one where hiI > 0, but the two
intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes (ρ = 1). In this case the two input prices are
always independent of Ii. Therefore, a change in Ii can affect the labor market outcomes
only through its impact on employment cost Bi. Finally, it follows from equations (20)
and (21) that our approach exhausts all possible channels of influence, since if ρ = 1
and hiI = 0, then the equilibrium is independent of the number of immigrants (skilled or
unskilled).
4.1 Variable Prices and no Search Costs
Consider first the case where ρ < 1 and the search cost hiI , i = H,L, is equal to zero.
As mentioned above, the latter assumption implies that there is no difference between a
native worker and an immigrant of the same type; in particular, wij = wi ∀j. Also, as
shown in Appendix A, equation (22), which gives the wage rate for each group, simplifies
to
wi = bi +
β
1− β
ci
q(θi)
[n+ r + si +m(θi)], i = H,L. (24)
Proposition 2. If the two intermediate inputs are imperfect substitutes (ρ < 1) and
there is no search cost (hiI = 0) then
dθH
dIH
< 0,
dθL
dIH
> 0,
duHj
dIH
> 0,
duLj
dIH
< 0,
dwHj
dIH
< 0 and
dwLj
dIH
> 0, j = N, I.
The effects of a change in IL have analogous signs.
An increase in the number of skilled immigrants IH raises the productivity of unskilled
labor and lowers that of skilled. Hence, the price of the unskilled input pL goes up,
while the price of the skilled input pH goes down. Since higher (lower) prices lead to
higher (lower) profits, this induces the entry of unskilled jobs and raises the tightness
in the unskilled sector θL; at the same time, it discourages the entry of skilled jobs and
causes the tightness in the skilled sector θH to go down. We can demonstrate these
effects graphically using Figure 2. An increase in IH shifts the OH curve to the left
(from OH to OH ′). On the other hand, since the employment cost does not change and
there are only price effects, the EP curve does not shift. Thus, the equilibrium moves
from point A to point B; θH goes down, while θL goes up. Given these changes in the
flow probabilities, the rest of the comparative statics follow easily; namely, a decrease
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in the probability of finding a match raises the unemployment rate among skilled native
or immigrant workers (since uHN = uHI) and lowers both their marginal product and
their outside option and hence their wage (note also that wHN = wHI , since in this case
native and immigrant workers are identical). The opposite holds for the unskilled workers.
Finally, the effects of a change in IL have a similar interpretation. In fact, notice from
equations (20) and (21) that, in this case, the marginal products of the two types of labor
depend only on their relative numbers, namely on the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor,
Λ = (λ+IL)/(1−λ+IH). Thus, the effects of an increase in IH , for example, are identical
to those of a skill-biased increase in immigration (decrease in Λ).
4.2 Fixed Prices and Search Cost
Next we analyze the other special case where ρ = 1 but hiI > 0. Here the results are very
different from the ones found above. In particular, consider
Proposition 3. If the two intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes and immigrants
face a search cost, then a change in IH has no impact on θL, uLN = uLI , wLN , and wLI ,
whereas
dθH
dIH
> 0,
duHj
dIH
< 0, and
dwHj
dIH
> 0, j = N, I.
The effects of a change in IL have analogous signs.
To understand the results summarized in Proposition 3, notice that in this case the two
prices are constant: pL = α and pH = (1−α)(1−x) [xkγ + (1− x)]
1−γ
γ , where, as implied
by (2) and (5), k assumes a constant value. On the other hand, the employment cost to
a firm of type i, Bi, depends on the relative number of native to total labor of type i, φi
(and not on Λ). This is so because, as can be seen from equation (22), when hiI > 0 = hiN ,
the wage rate of immigrants is lower than that of native workers who are of the same skill
type; that is, wiI < wiN , i = H,L, because immigrants are subject to higher search costs.
Intuitively, searching is costlier for immigrants, which forces them to accept lower wages.
For a firm, hiring an immigrant is therefore more profitable than hiring a native, given
that they are both equally productive. It follows that the increase in the immigrants’
share of skilled labor force lowers the expected employment cost in the high-skill sector
BH , by lowering the probability that an unemployed and skilled worker is native (φH).
This spurs high-skill job entry with a concomitant increase in the matching rate and thus
the outside option for high-skill workers. Consequently, this leads to an increase in the
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wage of high-skill native workers wHN , given by equation (22), and a decrease in their
unemployment rate uHN = UHN/1 − λ (see equation 16). Finally, the market tightness
θL for low-skill workers is given by (20). Note that if ρ = 1 then θL is independent of the
number of high-skill immigrants. Therefore, the wage rate and the unemployment rate for
low-skill workers will remain the same, following an influx of skilled immigrants. This is
illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The curve that depicts the locus of points along which
profit is zero in the high-skill (low-skill) sector is HH (LL). An increase in the number
of high-skill immigrants leaves the second curve unchanged but shifts the first curve to
the right (to H ′H ′). Thus, the equilibrium moves from point A to point B; θH goes up,
whereas θL remains the same.
5 General Case
Next we analyze the equilibrium in the general case, where ρ < 1 and hiI > 0, i = L,H.
In this general case, a change in IL or IH can influence the equilibrium through the impact
of such a change on both prices and expected employment costs.
From our analysis above, we can infer that in this general case the impact of an increase
in the number of immigrants will be unambiguously positive, both in terms of wages and
unemployment, on the native workers whose skills become relatively more scarce, owing
to the entry of new immigrants. However, the impact on the natives whose skills become
relatively more abundant is in general ambiguous. This is so because the price effect is
negative (Proposition 2), whereas the employment cost effect is positive (Proposition 3).
In this section we therefore calibrate the general model to the US data with the aim
to quantitatively assess the overall impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes
(wages and unemployment rates) for natives of both skill groups. We further use this
calibration exercise to provide insights on how immigration affects the total steady-state
surplus of the economy, i.e., the total income to natives net of the flow cost of vacancies.5
We make the assumption that all firms belong to natives, who therefore receive all the
net profits. Thus, our measure of net income to natives (labeled as surplus 1) is given by
Y˜ = Y + bHUHN + bLULN − cHVH − cLVL − wHI(IH − UHI)− wLI(IL − ULI),
i.e., it is equal to the total flow of output, Y , plus the output-equivalent flow to native
5The change in net income is a conventional measure of welfare change in this class of models (see,
e.g., Acemoglu 2001).
15
workers who are not currently employed, bHUHN + bLULN , minus the flow costs of job
creation for skilled and unskilled vacancies, cHVH and cLVL, respectively, minus the wages
paid to currently employed skilled and unskilled immigrants, given by wHI(IH − UHI)
and wLI(IL − ULI), respectively. In our simulation exercises below, we also consider an
alternative measure of the net income to natives (labeled as surplus 2) that does not
include the income enjoyed by the unemployed, that is, Y˜ − bHUHN − bLULN .6
In what follows we first describe the baseline calibration and then discuss the quan-
titative predictions of the general model. We end the section with a sensitivity analysis
with respect to the production parameters ρ and γ.
5.1 Calibration
For both simplicity and realism (see Blanchard and Diamond, 1991), in our calibration
we use a Cobb-Douglas matching function, M = ξU εi V
1−ε
i , which exhibits standard prop-
erties. The scale parameter ξ indexes the efficiency of the matching process.
Our model economy is fully characterized by 21 parameters. The interest rate, r,
the parameters in the matching function, ξ and ε, the workers’ bargaining power, β, the
production parameters, ρ, γ, α and x, the job separation rates, sL and sH , the capital
depreciation rate, δ, the numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrants, IL and IH , the
population birth rate, n, the share of unskilled labor force, λ, the unemployment flow
incomes, bL and bH , the vacancy costs, cL and cH , and the search costs, hLI and hHI . We
choose the parameters of the model to match the US data during the period January 1990
to December 1999. We then simulate the effects of a decade-long increase in the number
of immigrants, corresponding to the period 2000-2009. One period in the model economy
represents one month, so all the parameters are interpreted monthly. A summary of our
calibration is given in Table 1.
First, we calculated the average 30-year treasury constant maturity bond rate over
the period 1990-1999 and the average GDP deflator over the same period. The difference
between these two figures, which constitutes a measure of the real interest rate, is 4.76%,
implying a monthly rate (r) of approximately 0.4%. This is a commonly used value.
Second, following common practice, we set the unemployment elasticity of the matching
function to ε = 0.5, which is within the range of estimates reported in Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001). Third, following the literature, we postulate the worker’s bargaining
6We also compute the overall surpluses 1 and 2, which include the wages paid to immigrants.
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power to be β = 0.5, so that the Hosios condition (β = ε) is met (see Hosios, 1990).
Fourth, as in Krusell et al. (2000), we define as skilled a worker with at least a Bachelor’s
degree.7 Moreover, in our baseline calibration we adopt their parameter estimates for the
US economy, ρ = 0.401 and γ = −0.495, but we also perform an extensive sensitivity
analysis with respect to these parameters.8 Fifth, using matched monthly data from the
basic Current Population Survey (CPS), we estimated the average skilled and unskilled
separation rates to be 0.019 and 0.034, respectively.9 Sixth, data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis give a value of 0.0061 for the monthly depreciation rate of the capital
stock.10 Seventh, for the initial numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrants we set IL =
0.089 and IH = 0.036. Data for these measures come from the Public Use Microdata of
the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses. We define as “immigrants” non-citizens and naturalized
citizens.11 Eighth, using also the Public Use Microdata of the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses
and applying the same restrictions as in footnote 11, we find the monthly growth rate of
the native labor force to be 0.071%. Finally, the percentage of US-born workers without
a Bachelor’s degree is set to λ = 0.726, as measured from the March CPS. Thus, the
percentage of college graduates (IH/(IL + IH)) is slightly higher among immigrants than
among native labor force (1− λ) (0.288 vis-a`-vis 0.274).
We jointly calibrated the remaining nine parameters by matching nine calibration
targets obtained from US data over the period of interest, namely, 1990-1999. More
specifically, our first two targets are the average employment rates of workers with at
least a Bachelor’s degree and of workers with less than a Bachelor’s degree. Using data
7Our production technology (described in equations 1 and 2) assumes that workers within each of
the two skill groups are perfect substitutes to each other. Given that we allow for only two skill groups,
this assumption may seem relatively strong. However, a variety of estimates based on US data suggest
that given our partition of workers into “high-school equivalents” and “college equivalents”, the simple
two-skill model that we employ works. Workers of different age and experience within each of these two
skill groups tend to be perfect substitutes (see Card, 2009 for an overview of this evidence).
8Many recent aggregate time series studies estimate the elasticity of substitution between college and
high school graduates to be in the range 1.5 − 2.5; the implied values for ρ are in the range 0.333 − 0.6
(see Card 2009).
9These measures include employment to unemployment and employment to inactivity transitions.
In Appendix B we show that when the employment to inactivity transitions are excluded from our
calculations of the separation rates, the results are essentially unaffected (see Table B1).
10The definition of capital stock that we used includes nonresidential equipment and software as well
as nonresidential structures.
11To obtain appropriate values of IL and IH we divide the number of immigrants in the data by the
native labor force, because in the model the native labor force is normalized to unity. As census data are
available only every 10 years, we take the average over the years 1990 and 2000 only. The samples used
to compute these and all other relevant measures include only ages 25 to 65, while they exclude those
who are not in the labor force (report zero weeks of work, no wage income or are enrolled in school) as
well as those who are in the military.
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from the March CPS, we found them 0.976 and 0.939, respectively. Moreover, using data
also from the March CPS, we estimated the college-plus wage premium to be 61.1%.
Our next target is the capital to output ratio, which was computed using data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Specifically, the capital stock is defined as
in footnote 10. This variable was then divided by a measure of private output that is
equal to the Gross Domestic Product − Gross Housing Value Added − Compensation of
Government Employees. This way, we found the value of 1.348 for the capital to output
ratio. Our fifth target is the vacancy to unemployment ratio. Using the Conference
Board’s Help-Wanted Index (HWI), this was found equal to 0.620.12
Following Borjas and Friedberg (2009), we define “new immigrants” as those who
arrived in the five years prior to the respective Census. Moreover, we calculated hourly
earnings as annual wage and salary income, divided by weeks worked per year, divided
by hours worked per week. Thus, we can obtain our next two targets which are the
native-immigrant wage gap for skilled (−18.8%) and unskilled (−19.0%) workers. Finally,
our last two targets are the replacement ratios (ratio of unemployment to employment
income) for both skill groups. In our baseline calibration we used Hall and Milgrom’s
(2008) estimate for the ratio of unemployment to employment income, which includes
both unemployment insurance and the value of non-market activity. Their estimate of
0.71 is a standard value commonly used in recent studies.13 Nevertheless, the typical
replacement ratio of unemployment insurance of 0.40 (see Shimer 2005) can be considered
as a lower bound for the ratio of unemployment to employment income. In Table B2 in
Appendix B, we show that using Shimer’s replacement ratio of 0.40 does not alter the
results in any significant way.
5.2 Results
Using the Public Use Microdata, we find that over the period January 2000-December
2009 the change in IL was 0.051 and the change in IH 0.026, i.e., 5.1% and 2.6% of the
native labor force, respectively. Moreover, the total increase in the US labor force resulting
12Data on vacancies from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) are only available
since December 2000. The best available proxy for the number of vacant jobs for the years prior to 2000
is the Conference Board’s HWI. We adjusted the HWI to the JOLTS units of measurement using the
JOLTS data and then divided by the unemployment rate, as measured from the March CPS files, to
obtain the vacancy to unemployment ratio over the period of interest.
13See, for instance, Pissarides (2009) and Brugemann and Moscarini (2010).
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from international immigration over this period was approximately 6.8%.14 Crucially,
the immigration influx over the period of interest is biased towards skilled labor. More
specifically, it follows from the aforementioned data that Λ, the ratio of unskilled to skilled
labor, decreased from 2.629 to 2.577.
In Table 2 we summarize the effects of an immigration influx of the same magnitude
and composition in terms of skills as the one in the data. We report results obtained from
the general model, calibrated to US data as described above, but also, for comparability,
from three alternative specifications. In the first specification, we set hLI = hHI = 0.
There are therefore only price effects in this case (this is the case considered in Proposition
2). In the second specification, we keep the assumption hHI = 0, but set hLI = 1.182,
as calibrated above. Finally, in the last case, we set hLI = 0 but set hHI equal to the
calibrated value of 4.203.15
When natives and immigrants face identical search costs (second column in Table 2)
the increase in the number of immigrants causes θL to rise and θH to fall in line with
the results derived in Proposition 2. Because the college-intensive immigration influx
raises the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, the marginal product of skilled workers
and thus the price of the skilled labor input falls, while the marginal product and the
price of unskilled labor rises, leading to lower job entry in the high-skill sector and higher
in the low-skill sector. The unskilled native workers therefore benefit from an increase in
both their marginal product and value of outside option, which push their wage up. At
the same time, their unemployment rate falls, as their job finding probability increases.
The skilled workers, by contrast, undergo a wage decline, as both their marginal product
and outside option deteriorate, and an increase in their unemployment rate, as their job
finding rate falls.
When we allow for skilled immigrants and natives to have differential search costs
(third column), the impact of the same immigration influx on skilled job entry turns
from negative to positive and large. In this case, despite the fall in the price of the
skilled labor input, the rise in the number of skilled immigrants encourages the entry of
skilled jobs by lowering the cost firms expect to pay on average in order to hire a skilled
worker. The consequent increase in their job finding rate, causes their unemployment
14In conducting their simulation exercises, Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) used
an immigrant influx that increased the size of the total workforce by 11.0% and 11.4%, respectively.
15Throughout all exercises presented in the Tables 2-8 below, we find Condition 1, which precludes the
option of a firm to wait until an immigrant worker arrives, to be satisfied.
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rate to fall. However, in determining their wage, the drop in their marginal product
dominates the improvement in their job finding rate and thus in their bargaining position
in wage setting. Therefore, their wage still falls. Because skilled and unskilled labor
are complements in the production of the final good, the presence of differential search
costs between immigrant and native skilled workers improves the impact of immigration
on the unskilled native workers as well, both in terms of employment and wages. The
immigration-induced increase in skilled job entry, and as a consequence in YH , leads to an
even larger increase in the price of unskilled labor input and therefore to an even larger
increase in θL.
The same immigration influx has also a more positive impact on natives of both skill
types when differential search costs between immigrant and native unskilled workers are
introduced (fourth column). In this case, the decline in the expected cost BL of firms
seeking to establish an employment relation with an unskilled worker adds to the increase
in the price of the unskilled labor input, causing a much larger increase in unskilled job
entry, and as a consequence, a much larger fall in the unemployment rate of unskilled
workers. Reasoning as above, the larger increase in the unskilled labor input, YL, benefits
also the skilled workers. Specifically, the increase in YL raises the marginal product of
skilled workers, thereby counteracting partially the adverse effect of immigration on the
price of the skilled labor input, pH . The drop in θH is therefore smaller in this case
compared to the case where immigrants and native unskilled workers are identical.
The results of the general model calibrated to the US data - where immigrants and
natives of both skill types face differential search costs and hence have different wages -
are summarized in the last column of Table 2. As above, the drop in the expected cost BL
reinforces the effect of the rise in the price of the unskilled labor input on unskilled job
entry, leading to a large increase in the tightness prevailing in the unskilled sector. As a
result, the unemployment rate of unskilled workers drops by 11.0%. Because the wage of
skilled immigrants is also significantly lower than that of skilled natives, the immigration
influx causes a large decline also in the expected employment cost of firms seeking to hire
skilled workers. Job entry in the skilled sector therefore rises, causing the unemployment
rate of skilled workers to fall by 17.26%. In terms of wages, for the reasons explained
above the wage of unskilled native workers increases by 0.59%, while that of skilled native
workers falls by 0.48%. In all cases considered, the surge in immigration lowers the
unemployment rate of natives overall and raises the total income of the economy. With
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differential search costs, the impact is also positive on the overall wage of native workers
although quantitatively small. Hence, the immigration inflow raises the surplus of native
workers, mainly because it induces job creation; as a consequence, it lowers their overall
unemployment rate and raises the total income of the economy. The largest increase in
income and native wage rate and the largest fall in the native unemployment rate occur
when immigrants of both types earn lower wages than their competing natives, as the US
data dictate. In this case, the native unemployment rate falls by 11.79%, total income
increases by 7.41% and the native wage rate increases by 0.15%, leading to an increase in
the surplus of natives between 0.6% (surplus1) and 1% (surplus 2).
It is also worth commenting on the impact of the immigration influx on the labor mar-
ket outcomes for the existing immigrants. Clearly, with identical search costs, immigration
has the same consequences, both in terms of wages and unemployment, on workers of the
same skill type, irrespective of their origin. Nevertheless, with differential search costs the
impact of immigration in terms of wages appears to be more positive on immigrants than
on natives. To understand why recall that an increase in market tightness influences the
equilibrium wage through two channels: 1) through its impact on the marginal product of
labor; an increase in tightness raises employment and decreases the marginal product of
labor, thereby lowering the worker’s wage; 2) through its impact on the worker’s value of
outside option; an increase in tightness raises the value of search, thereby strengthening
the worker’s position in wage setting, and in turn, causing his wage to rise. When search
is much costlier for immigrants than for natives, this second channel is much more impor-
tant for the former, which explains why the impact of an immigration-induced increase
in market tightness on their wage is more positive. For these workers, a small increase
in their chances of finding a job implies a much larger increase (in percentage terms) in
their bargaining power and in turn on their wage.
Notice also in the last two columns of Table 2 that the overall wage of the unskilled
decreases, even though the wages of both groups that compose this category (unskilled
native and immigrant) go up. We see this, at first sight, paradoxical result in several of
the tables that follow. It occurs because the total sum of wages, which in this case is
λwLN + ILwLI , goes up by less than the total number of workers, λ+ IL.
As shown in Appendix B, our results are robust when we change parameters β (second
column in Tables B4 and B5) and ε (second column in Tables B6 and B7) and then re-
calibrate the model to obtain some of the other parameter values as well as when we keep
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all other parameters the same (Tables B10 and B13). The same is true with respect to
changes in unskilled and skilled unemployment income bL and bH (see Tables B16 and
B19). Finally, Figure C1 in Appendix C presents the dynamic adjustment of several
variables in our model. These results are consistent with our stead-state results (details
are given in Appendix C).
5.3 Changing the Elasticity of Substitution between Labor and
Capital
The results above are derived using the elasticities of substitution between the input
factors estimated by Krusell et al. (2000). Nevertheless, in this subsection we examine
how robust the general model’s predictions are to alternative values for the elasticities of
substitution between capital and the skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
For the nested CES production function, given in equations (1) and (2), the Allen-
Hicks elasticities of substitution between unskilled labor YL and the other two factors,
skilled labor YH and capital K, are identical and given by σLK = σLH =
1
1−ρ . The Allen-
Hicks elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital is a function of factor
shares. Nevertheless, following Krusell et al. (2000) and Ben-Gad (2008), we employ
a simplified definition of the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital:
σHK =
1
1−γ .
In Table 3 we report the results from the general model for different sets of values for
the parameters ρ and γ.16 As in Ben-Gad (2008), we consider a set where both elasticities
are low (σLK = 1, σHK = 0.5), a set where both elasticities are high (σLK = 2, σHK = 1),
and two sets where one elasticity is high and the other low, (σLK = 1, σHK = 1) and
(σLK = 2, σHK = 0.5). The results are qualitatively robust to our choices of σLK and
σHK . In all cases the impact of the skill-biased immigration that took place in the period
2000-2009 is positive in terms of unemployment on both skilled and unskilled workers,
because it leads to higher job entry in both sectors. In terms of wages, it is positive on
the unskilled and negative on the skilled native workers. Further, the model’s predictions
about the impact of immigration on total income and surplus for natives remain the same;
skill-biased immigration raises both of them.
Moreover, the effect of the type of immigration analyzed here on unskilled job entry
16The rest of the parameters remain the same, as calibrated above. On the contrary, in Table B3 in
Appendix B, we change the production parameters ρ and γ and then re-calibrate the model to obtain
the other parameter values.
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becomes significantly more positive as the elasticity of substitution between skilled la-
bor/capital and unskilled labor declines (i.e., as ρ decreases). Given that skilled labor
and capital are complements to each other, the immigration-induced increase in the ratio
of skilled to unskilled labor input, 1/Λ, and the resulting increase in capital causes a
larger increase in the marginal product of unskilled labor when ρ is small. Consequently,
at lower values of ρ the increase in unskilled job entry and the consequent positive effects
on the wage and employment of unskilled workers are larger. Similar reasoning explains
why the effect of immigration on unskilled job entry becomes more positive as the degree
of capital-skill complementarity increases (i.e., as γ decreases). At lower values of γ an in-
crease in YH has a larger positive impact on the equilibrium value of capital and therefore
the marginal product of the unskilled labor. Finally, Table B3 in Appendix B presents
the results of the general model with both differential search costs when we change the
values of the production parameters and then re-calibrate the model to obtain some of
the other parameter values, as we did above. The results we obtain are similar.
6 Extensions
In this section, we extend the basic model in four different directions. First, we analyze an
inflow of immigration with the same skill distribution as in the existing labor force. We
call this a skill-balanced increase in immigration.17 Second, we let immigrants be imperfect
substitutes for native workers of the same skill type. Third, we consider endogenous skill
acquisition on behalf of native workers. Finally, we allow natives and immigrants to be
completely different factors both before and after an employment relation commences.
Specifically, natives and immigrants search for employment in separate labor markets and
are imperfect substitutes to each other in production.
6.1 Skill-Balanced Immigration
The case of skill-balanced immigration is a case rarely considered but nevertheless very
close to reality. In fact, as mentioned above, the inflow of immigrants during the period
2000-2009 was more college intensive than the existing US labor force. For example, the
average percentage of US citizens with at least a Bachelor’s degree during the period 1990-
1999 was 27.4%. The same percentage among immigrants was 28.8%. On the other hand,
17We are grateful to a referee for suggesting to us this and the last extension.
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the percentage of foreign-born labor force with at least a Bachelor’s degree that entered
in the period 2000-2009 was 33.8%, i.e., more college intensive than the existing stock of
natives (the data are from the US Public Use Microdata samples; see also Ottaviano and
Peri 2012 for the United States and Docquier, O¨zden and Peri 2010 for other countries).
With a skill-balanced increase in immigration the ratio of unskilled to skilled (denoted
above by Λ) does not change. Hence, if the search cost of immigrants (hiI) is equal to
zero, then a balanced increase in immigration will have no impact. Both the price of
input i (pi), which equals the revenue to the firm from employing a worker of skill type
i, and the expected cost to the firm from establishing an employment relation (Bi) are
independent of the number of immigrants (Ii).
On the other hand, if there is a search cost, then, even with a skill-balanced increase
in immigration, the probability that a type i and unemployed worker is native (denoted
by φi, i = L,H) goes down. Thus,
Proposition 4. If immigrants face a search cost (hiI > 0) and there is no capital stock
(x = 0), then after a skill-balanced increase in immigration dI
dθH
dI
> 0,
dθL
dI
> 0,
duHN
dI
< 0,
duLN
dI
< 0,
dwHj
dI
> 0 and
dwLj
dI
> 0, j = N, I
where dI = [(1 + I)/(λ+ IL)]dIL = [(1 + I)/(1− λ+ IH)]dIH and I = IL + IH .
The intuition is straightforward. A balanced increase in immigration lowers the proba-
bility that a type i and unemployed worker is native, which lowers the expected cost from
establishing an employment relation, since natives receive higher wages. As a consequence
there is firm entry, which lowers unemployment and raises wages.
The consequences of a skill-balanced immigration flow in our calibrated model where
capital is allowed to adjust optimally are summarized in Table 4. We consider an increase
in immigration that increases the total labor force by 0.077, as above, but leaves the
ratio of skilled to unskilled unchanged. To achieve this we increase IH by 0.021 and IL
by 0.056. Since capital is complementary to skilled labor, as YH increases due to firm
entry, the marginal product of capital and therefore its equilibrium value also increases.
Nevertheless, the increase in capital is smaller than the increase in the number of skilled
immigrants and hence the ratio of capital to skilled labor decreases (see the equation
that defines k). Thus, on the one hand the expected cost of establishing an employment
relation, Bi, drops, but, on the other, the price of each type of intermediate input, pi,
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may go down as well. In the case analyzed in Table 4, the former effect dominates on the
latter and hence the matching rates for both types of labor increase. Therefore, in line
with Proposition 4, a skill-balanced increase in immigration is positive on both skill types
in terms of both wages and employment.
Comparing the impact of the 2000-2009 skill-intensive increase (last column of Table
2) to that of the balanced increase, we see that in terms of wages the balanced increase
in immigration has a smaller positive impact on unskilled workers. This is to be expected
since with a balanced increase the positive impact of a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor on the marginal product of unskilled workers disappears. However, in terms of job
entry and unemployment, the balanced increase in immigration has a more positive impact
on the unskilled workers and less positive on the skilled workers, compared to the 2000-
2009 skill-intensive increase. To understand why, notice that the increase in the number
of unskilled immigrants is larger and the increase in the number of skilled immigrants is
smaller in the balanced increase than in the skill-intensive increase. This implies a larger
increase in the probability that a type i and unemployed worker is immigrant for firms
directing their search towards unskilled workers and smaller for firms searching for skilled
workers (i.e., a larger increase in 1− φL and smaller in 1− φH). For this reason, the fall
in the expected employment cost and the resulting increase in job creation is higher in
the unskilled and lower in the skilled sector.
6.2 Imperfect Substitution
Next we allow native and immigrant labor of the same type to be imperfect substitutes
in production. More specifically, the production function of the final good is still given
by (1), where Q is defined in (2). Furthermore, each of the two labor inputs, YL and YN
is another CES sub-aggregate, namely,
YL = [ψY
η
LN + (1− ψ)Y ηLI ]1/η, 1 > ψ > 0, η ≤ 1, (25)
and
YH = [ζY
ν
HN + (1− ζ)Y νHI ]1/ν , 1 > ζ > 0, ν ≤ 1, (26)
where, for example, YLN denotes unskilled native labor. Crucially, however, vacancies
cannot be opened for immigrants or natives only (see more on this in Subsection 6.4
below).
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Clearly, native and immigrant labor of the same type have now different marginal
products and hence different prices, pij:
pLN = αψY
η−1
LN Y
ρ−η
L Y
1−ρ, (27)
pHN = (1− α)(1− x)ζY ν−1HN Y γ−νH Qρ−γY 1−ρ, (28)
pLI = α(1− ψ)Y η−1LI Y ρ−ηL Y 1−ρ, (29)
pHI = (1− α)(1− x)(1− ζ)Y ν−1HI Y γ−νH Qρ−γY 1−ρ. (30)
The price of capital on the other hand is still given by (5). As before, the marginal
products pij can be expressed as functions of the indicators of the tightness in the labor
markets θi (see Appendix A).
Next, following the same procedure as the one outlined in Appendix A for the deriva-
tion of equations (20)-(22), we arrive at the following two equations that determine θH
and θL:
φipiN + (1− φi)piI = Bi, i = L,H, (31)
where hij = 0 if j = N, as before. The left-hand side of (31) gives the expected benefit to
a firm from a match with a worker of skill-type i, whereas the right-hand side gives the
expected cost from establishing an employment relation of that type. Free entry requires
that the two be equal. Moreover, the wage rate accrued to a worker of skill i and origin j
from a match is still given by equation (22), where pij replaces pi. Note that in general, the
effects of a change in IL, or IH , on the matching rates and hence θH and θL are ambiguous
since, without further restrictions, we cannot determine the impact of a change in one of
the four labor inputs on the marginal products/prices of the other three. Consider:
Proposition 5. If the two intermediate inputs (YH and YL) are perfect substitutes
(ρ = 1), immigrants face a search cost (hiI > 0) and pHI > pHN , then a change in IH has
no impact on θL, uLN = uLI , wLN and wLI , whereas
dθH
dIH
> 0,
duHN
dIH
< 0,
dwHN
dIH
> 0 and
dwHI
dIH
< 0.
Under similar conditions, the effects of a change in IL have analogous signs.
In the case where native and immigrant workers of the same type were perfect substitutes,
immigrants had a lower outside option but the same marginal product as natives. In
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contrast, in the case analyzed in this subsection, they have a lower outside option and
a different marginal product from natives. Hence, an increase, for example, in IH will
decrease the expected cost to an unfilled vacancy from being matched randomly with an
unskilled worker, BH , as before. Nevertheless, it will have an ambiguous effect on the
expected benefit from such a match φHpHN + (1 − φH)pHI . Given that the probability
that the match will be with a native, φH , decreases, the expected benefit will go up if
immigrants are at least as productive as natives, i.e., pHI > pHN . The other results follow
easily.
Next, we derive results in this generalized model (with ρ < 1) for different values of the
parameters η and ν. As an empirical basis for our choices of η and ν we use the estimates
reported in Ottaviano and Peri (2012). They first partition workers into groups based on
their education and experience characteristics. Then, using a CES aggregator similar to
the one in (25), they estimate the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants
sharing similar education and experience characteristics. Based on their estimates and
given our definition of unskilled workers, the elasticity between unskilled immigrant and
native workers σLILN ≡ 11−η should range from about 6.5 to about 20, meaning that η
should lie somewhere between 0.85 and 0.95. Furthermore, since their results show no
evidence of imperfect substitutability between college educated immigrants and natives,
we let immigrant and native skilled labor be perfect substitutes. This corresponds to
the case where YH = YHN + YHI replaces (26), so that pHI = pHN . Nevertheless, as an
additional robustness test, we also consider the case where immigrants and natives of both
labor types are imperfect substitutes, as described above, and derive results for values of
η and ν between 0.85 and 0.95. Also, in lack of good empirical estimates that can guide
our choices of values for ψ and ζ, for the results below we set ψ = ζ = 0.75. This value
ensures that, given the other parameters of the model, Condition 1 is satisfied, i.e., the
option to wait will never be exercised by firms that search for either skilled or unskilled
workers. We keep the rest of the parameter values as described above.
The results in the case where only unskilled immigrant and native labor are imperfects
substitutes are shown in Table 5. As can be seen, our previous results are robust to the
generalized set-up. More specifically, as before, the skill-biased immigration analyzed
here leads to higher job entry in both sectors, raises the wage of unskilled workers and
lowers that of skilled native workers. Moreover, immigration raises the surplus accrued to
natives, because it raises output and the average wage and lowers the unemployment rate
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of both skill groups. Also, the smaller the degree of substitutability between native and
immigrant unskilled labor (i.e., the lower the value of η), the larger the positive impact
of immigration on both labor types. This is not surprising, since a smaller degree of
substitutability between unskilled natives and immigrants implies a larger positive impact
on the price of the native-unskilled labor input, pLN , following a skill-intensive increase in
immigration. It also implies a smaller positive impact on the price of immigrant-unskilled
labor input, pLI ; nevertheless, since firms are more likely to encounter a native as opposed
to an immigrant unskilled worker, the overall increase in the expected benefit to the firm
from hiring an unskilled worker (the left-hand-side of equation (31)) is larger, leading to
a larger increase in low-skill job entry. Reasoning as above, the resulting larger increase
in the unskilled labor input, YL, implies a smaller decline in the price of the skilled labor
input, pH , thereby improving also the consequences on skilled natives. In Table 6 (columns
2-4) we see that the same conclusions hold when immigrants and natives of both skill types
are imperfect substitutes and ν is fixed to 0.95.18
Turning to the impact of imperfect substitutability between immigrant and native
skilled workers, as shown in Table 6, the lower ν is, the more positive the impact on
skilled native workers is (compare the second column with the last two in Table 6, where
η = 0.95 throughout and ν decreases). In fact, as can be seen in all columns of Table
6, when immigrants and natives of both labor types are imperfect substitutes, the immi-
gration influx has a positive impact on skilled (and unskilled) natives not only in terms
of employment, but also in terms of wages. This is because at lower values of ν, the
immigration-induced fall in the marginal product of skilled native workers, and therefore
the price pHN , is smaller. The skilled immigrants, by contrast, suffer a larger decline in
their marginal product as the degree of substitutability between native and immigrant
skilled labor falls. Nevertheless, because natives capture a higher share of the skilled labor
force, at lower values of ν the immigration-induced decline in the expected benefit to the
firm from hiring a skilled worker is smaller. This explains why a low degree of substi-
tutability between immigrants and natives leads to a larger increase in θH following the
skill-intensive increase in the number of immigrants. Again, due to complementarities, the
impact of immigration becomes more positive on both labor types as ν falls. The larger
increase in YH caused by the larger increase in skilled job entry leads to a larger increase
in the price of the unskilled labor input. The consequent larger increase in unskilled job
18Card (2009) finds the elasticity of substitution between college-educated natives and immigrants are
in the range 16.67− 34.48; the implied values for ν are in the range 0.94− 0.97.
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entry improves the impact of immigration on unskilled native workers in terms of both
wages and employment.
Notice also that as the degree of substitutability between native and immigrant workers
of the same skill type falls, the wage effect on natives becomes more positive whereas that
on competing immigrants becomes less positive. Hence, a high degree of substitutability
between immigrants and natives means that the competition effects of additional im-
migrants fall more heavily on immigrants themselves, thereby lessening the burden on
natives.19 This occurs because as the degree of substitutability between immigrants and
natives decreases, the price effect of new immigrants becomes less negative on competing
natives and more negative on competing immigrants. To understand why, notice from
equations (27) and (29) that the ratio of immigrant to native unskilled labor input, YLI
YLN
,
has a positive impact on pLN and negative on pLI . At η = 1 this ratio disappears, meaning
that what matters for how prices respond to immigration is only the ratio of unskilled
to skilled labor, Λ; however, at lower values of η the impact becomes more favorable on
natives than on previous immigrants. Likewise, from (28) and (30), we see that at lower
values of ν, an increase in YHI
YHN
has a larger positive impact on pHN and negative on pHI .
It follows that at smaller values of ν the negative effect of the skilled-intensive immigra-
tion influx on wHI through pHI is larger, while the negative effect on wHN through pHN
is smaller in absolute value. Likewise, at smaller values of η the positive impact on wLI
through pLI is smaller, while that on wLN through pLN is larger in absolute value.
Even though the competition effects of additional immigrants fall more heavily on
previous immigrants, the wage of previous immigrants not only increases but increases
much more than the wage of natives. As explained above, this is because immigrants have
a much lower value of outside option, and thus wage, than natives, owing to their higher
search cost. Consequently, the higher availability of jobs has a larger impact in percentage
terms on their bargaining position and therefore wage. In the imperfect-substitutes case
the percentage impact on the wage of natives becomes even larger because of the shares
ψ and ζ that reduce the sizes of immigrant wages significantly.
Finally, Tables B4-B8, B11, B14, B17 and B20 examine the robustness of our results
with respect to changes in parameters β, ε, ψ, ζ, bL and bH . As before, we analyze the case
19The view that the competition effects of additional immigrant inflows are concentrated among im-
migrants themselves, lessening the negative impact on competing natives due to immigrants and natives
being imperfect substitutes, is also supported by evidence reported in Card (2009) and Ottaviano and
Peri (2012).
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where we change one parameter and keep all other values the same, as well as the case
where after changing one parameter we re-calibrate the model to get the other parameter
values (details are given in Appendix B).
6.3 Human Capital Accumulation
The next extension that we consider is to allow for endogenous skill acquisition on behalf
of native workers. We view this as an interesting case, as in the long run natives may
react to any negative pressure from immigrants by adjusting their skill level, while such
adjustments cannot take place in the short run.
Specifically, before entering the labor market each agent decides whether to invest in
education and become skilled or remain unskilled; that is, investment in human capi-
tal/skill is a discrete choice. Native young agents differ with respect to their ability to
learn, which in turn determines their cost of acquiring education. Older agents, on the
other hand, face an additional cost, which is prohibitive. Thus, older workers never opt
for training.20
Let the cost of acquiring training be denoted by z and assume that it is distributed
uniformly over the closed interval [0, z]. A native young agent κ will invest in education
if the benefit from this decision exceeds the cost, that is, a native young worker κ will
invest in education if
JUHN − JULN > zκ.
Thus, all agents with a cost of education lower than some value z∗ will invest in education,
where z∗ is given by
z∗ = JUHN − JULN .
In this case 1 − λ∗, the fraction of native workers that are skilled, is endogenous and is
given by
1− λ∗ = z
∗
z
. (32)
As shown in Appendix A, combining these equations and substituting away JUiN , i = L,H,
we get the following equation
(1− λ)z = 1
n+ r
{
βm(θH)pH + (n+ r + sH)bH
n+ r + sH + βm(θH)
− βm(θL)pL + (n+ r + sL)bL
n+ r + sL + βm(θL)
}
, (33)
which sets the cost to the last worker who receives training equal to the present value of
the benefit from a such a decision. Obviously, all workers with a cost lower than the one
20For a search and matching model that allows for re-training see Laing, Palivos and Wang (2003).
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given by the left-hand side of (33) invest in education. Equations (20), (21) and (33) then
determine the equilibrium triplet θ∗L, θ
∗
H , and λ
∗. Given these, we can get the equilibrium
values for all other variables by substituting in the appropriate equations.
Proposition 6. a) If there is no search cost then the effects of a change in IL or IH have
the same sign as in Proposition 2 but are smaller in magnitude. b) If the two intermediate
labor inputs are perfect substitutes then the effects of a change in IH have the same sign
as in Proposition 3 but are smaller in magnitude. Furthermore,
dθL
dIH
> 0,
duLN
dIH
< 0,
dwLN
dIH
> 0,
dwLI
dIH
> 0.
An increase in IL has analogous results.
The intuition behind the results derived in Proposition 6a are the same as that in Propo-
sition 2. Moreover, an increase, for example, in the number of skilled immigrants (which
results in a decrease in Λ) lowers the proportion of skilled workers (1 − λ), since both
the decrease in θH and the increase in θL that follow diminish the benefit of education.
Interestingly, starting from the same equilibrium, with endogenous changes in the skill
distribution the decrease in the tightness in the skilled sector θH is lower compared to the
case where λ is fixed. Similarly, the increase in θL is smaller when λ is allowed to adjust.
This occurs because the initial effect on prices is mitigated through changes in λ. More
specifically, the decrease in Λ is smaller when λ is allowed to adjust, so that the decrease
in pH and increase in pL are smaller, leading to smaller responses in job entry. In terms
of Figure 2, the curve EP remains unchanged but the shift of the curve OH to the left
is smaller compared with that in Proposition 2; e.g., the curve shifts to OH ′ when λ is
fixed but only to OH ′λ when λ is endogenously determined. The equilibrium moves from
point A to point B when λ is fixed and to point C when λ adjusts optimally. Hence, the
changes in both θH and θL are smaller in absolute value. This has important implications
because it makes the benefits of skilled immigration to unskilled native labor (i.e., the
decline in the unemployment rate and the increase in the wage rate) smaller and vice
versa. Similarly, the losses of (un-) skilled immigration to (un-) skilled native labor (i.e.,
the increase in the unemployment rate and the fall in the wage rate) are also smaller.
Regarding Proposition 6b, in the case where λ is endogenous, after an entry of skilled
immigrant workers, there will be an increase in the matching rate and the wage rate of
high-skill workers as well as a decrease in their unemployment rate, as was the case in
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Proposition 3. However, starting from the same equilibrium as in the case where λ is
fixed, these effects are smaller in magnitude, because the higher availability of skilled jobs
(due to the decline in the expected employment cost, BH) will increase the proportion of
natives that choose to become skilled. In turn, the decrease in λ will partially offset the
fall in BH , so that the increase in θH is smaller. Graphically in this case the equilibrium
can be presented as the intersection of two upward-sloping curves that depict the zero-
profit condition in the two sectors, such as HλHλ and LλLλ in Figure 3.
21 An increase
in the number of skilled immigrants leaves the LλLλ curve unchanged but shifts the
HλHλ curve to the right (to H
′
λH
′
λ). Recall that with fixed λ the equilibrium shifts from
point A to point B. Now that λ is endogenous and responds to changes in the matching
rates, the equilibrium moves from point A to point C; thus, the increase in θH is smaller.
Furthermore, in contrast to the case where λ is constant, with endogenous λ, θL and hence
the matching rate for low-skill workers goes up as well, with a concomitant decrease
in the unemployment rates uLN = uLI and an increase in wages wLN and wLI . The
reason for the increase in θL is that the decrease in λ implies a higher probability that an
unemployed unskilled worker is immigrant, which lowers the expected employment cost
and spurs entry of low-skill vacancies. Finally, notice that in this case, immigration is
beneficial for all groups, low-skill and high-skill, natives and immigrants, since it lowers
their unemployment rates and raises their wages.
In Table 7 we examine the consequences of the 2000-2009 immigration influx when
there is endogenous skill acquisition on behalf of natives. Allowing for endogenous skill
acquisition introduces a new parameter into the model, the upper bound to the cost of
acquiring education, z. The value of this parameter is taken to be 226.321, so that the
share of skilled among US-born workers equals 0.274, as above. Since we also keep all other
targets the same, the re-calibration of the model with endogenous skill accumulation yields
the same values for the rest of the parameters. The skill-intensive increase in immigration
raises the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor force, thereby lowering the marginal product
of skilled and raising that of unskilled workers. In response to the downward (upward)
pressure from immigration on the skilled (unskilled) wage, a higher share of the newly
21The reason that these two curves are upward-sloping is simple. Consider, for example, the zero profit
condition in the low-skill sector pL = BL. If the two inputs are perfect substitutes then the price pL is
constant and equal to α. An increase in θL will increase the cost of establishing an employment relation
BL. To restore the equilibrium θH must increase, so that the outside option for high-skill workers increases
and hence there is a decrease in λ, which will decrease BL. Moreover, it can easily be shown that HλHλ
is steeper than LλLλ.
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born native workforce chooses to remain unskilled. The resulting compositional shift in the
native labor force towards unskilled workers acts to mitigate the negative (positive) impact
of immigrants on the price of skilled (unskilled) input. It also raises (lowers) the expected
cost of establishing an employment relation with an unskilled (skilled) worker by lowering
(raising) the chances that a searching firm will encounter an immigrant as opposed to
a native unskilled (skilled) worker. These counteracting effects lessen the positive effect
of skill-biased immigration on the wages and employment of unskilled natives, but also
improve the consequences on skilled natives in terms of both employment and wages.
Specifically, skilled native workers suffer a smaller decline in their wage and a larger
increase in their employment rate. Since the unskilled capture a larger share of the native
labor force, the endogenous skill accumulation has a smaller positive impact on the overall
surplus of natives, compared with the case were the skill distribution is fixed (compare
the last column in Table 2 with the results in Table 7). Finally, Tables B4-B7 examine
the robustness of our results with respect to changes in parameters β and ε (details are
given in Appendix B).
6.4 Separate Labor Markets for Immigrants and Natives
In the final extension of the basic model, in addition to skill-specific jobs, we also allow
for origin-specific vacancies, i.e., vacancies that are suited only for natives or only for
immigrants. In other words, firms perform directed search towards different types of
workers. Hence, there will be four intermediate sectors and four labor markets. By
assumption, immigrants cannot search in the market for native jobs and vice versa.
The production side is the same as in Subsection 6.2; see equations (1), (2), (25) and
(26). The price of all five inputs, pK and pij, i = L,H and j = N, I, are still given by
equations (5) and (27)-(30), respectively.
Also, in each of the four labor markets unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies
match according to a technology M(Uij, Vij), where Uij and Vij denote respectively the
number of unemployed workers and vacancies of skill type i and origin j. Furthermore,
the tightness in each market θij is defined as previously, namely, θij = M(Uij, Vij)/Uij.
The equations that determine the asset values in steady state are the same as before
with the exception of (6), which now becomes
rJVij = −ci + q(θij)
[
JFij − JVij
]
. (34)
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Moreover, free entry now implies JVij = 0. Solving the system formed by the free-entry
condition, (7)-(9), (12)-(13) and (34), we find that
pij = Bij, Bij ≡ bi − hij + ci[n+ r + si + βm(θij)]
(1− β)q(θij) , (35)
where hij = 0 if j = N, as before. The marginal products pij can be expressed as functions
of the indicators of the tightness in the labor markets θij (see Appendix A). Equations
(35) then form a system of four equations that determine the four variables θij in terms
of IL, IH and the other parameters of the model. Having determined θij, we can find next
the equilibrium wages wij and unemployment rates uij by substituting in the appropriate
expressions (these follow from equations (16)-(17) and (22) after replacing θi with θij).
Recall that natives and immigrants search in different labor markets; thus, the number
of skilled or unskilled immigrants does not affect the probability that a type i and unem-
ployed worker is native anymore. Consequently, the expected cost of an unfilled vacancy,
BiN , which is suited only for a native of type i, remains unchanged following an increase in
immigration. In other words, the effect of higher job creation that we described previously
disappears. Nevertheless, in general, the effects of a change in IL, or IH , on the matching
rates are ambiguous since, without further restrictions, we cannot determine the impact
of a change in one of the four labor inputs on the marginal products/prices of the other
three. Nevertheless, consider:
Proposition 7. If the two intermediate inputs (YH and YL) are perfect substitutes
(ρ = 1),
dθij
dIκ

< 0 if j = I and i = κ
> 0 if j = N and i = κ
= 0 if i 6= κ
, i, κ = L,H, j = I,N.
Moreover, sign
(
dwij
dIκ
)
=sign
(
dθij
dIκ
)
and sign
(
duij
dIκ
)
= −sign
(
dθij
dIκ
)
.
If ρ = 1, then high-skill and low-skill labor inputs are perfect substitutes. Hence, the
market for each of these two types of labor is independent of the amount of immigrant
labor of the other type. Moreover, high-skill native and immigrant labor inputs are com-
plementary to each other. Thus, an increase in high-skill immigrant labor will decrease
the marginal product of high-skill immigrants and increase that of high-skill natives. In
the end, this will raise the matching rate of high-skill native workers with a concomitant
increase in their wage and a decrease in their unemployment rate. The effects on the ex-
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isting high-skill immigrants are exactly the opposite. An increase in low-skill immigration
will have analogous effects to that of high-skill.
We simulate this alternative setting to obtain results in the more general case where
ρ < 1. To accommodate the comparison with the previous cases we derive results for
values of η and ν between 0.85 and 0.95 and keep the rest of the parameter values un-
changed.22 The results are presented in Table 8. As explained above, when separate
markets for immigrants and natives exist, an increase in the number of immigrants has
only price effects, because it leaves the expected cost of establishing an employment rela-
tion unchanged. This explains why in this case the impact of the skilled-intensive increase
in immigration on matching rates is much smaller in magnitude (compare Tables 6 and 8).
For the native workers of both types the impact is still positive in terms of both employ-
ment and wages. For the unskilled native workers, both the increase in the ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor and the increase in the immigrant to native unskilled labor push their
marginal product up. As the price of the unskilled-native input increases, firms respond
by opening more vacancies suited for unskilled-native workers. On the other hand, there
are two countervailing effects on the marginal product of the skilled native workers. First,
the increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor that tends to lower it, and second,
the increase in the immigrant to native skilled labor that tends to raise it. However, as
above, because immigrant and native skilled labor are imperfect substitutes the positive
effect dominates. Thus, job creation in the skilled-native market increases.
As discussed above, when immigrants and natives compete for the same jobs the
impact of immigration on previous immigrants is positive and large, mainly because of the
effect of higher job entry that lowers their unemployment rate and significantly improves
their bargaining position and therefore wage. Nevertheless, in the case where there are
separate markets, the effect of higher job creation on previous immigrants disappears.
The entry of new immigrants does not lower the expected employment cost of firms
searching for immigrant labor and thus does not encourage the creation of vacancies
suited for immigrants. Instead, as immigrant labor becomes relatively more abundant
the price of immigrant labor input falls relative to the price of the native labor input,
with negative consequence on the number of jobs available to immigrants and on their
22Notice that allowing for native and immigrant labor of the same type to be perfect substitutes to
each other does not make sense in this set up. Given that firms can direct their vacancies towards only
immigrants or only natives, if the native and immigrant labor were identical then firms would only direct
their vacancies towards immigrants, who are willing to accept lower wages. If this were the case then
there would be no market for native workers.
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wage.23 As above, a lower degree of substitutability between immigrant and native workers
(lower ν or/and η) shifts the competition effects of additional immigrants on immigrants
themselves, thereby improving the consequences on both types of native workers, given
that they are complements in the production of the final good.
Next, it is worth mentioning that despite the fact that in separate markets the effect
of higher job creation that comes through lower expected employment costs is absent,
the effect of immigration is still positive on the native workers overall. The entry of new
immigrants raises the average wage and lowers the average unemployment rate of native
workers. Further, it raises their surplus and the total income of the economy.
Finally, Tables B4-B7, B9, B12, B15, B18 and B21 examine the robustness of our
results with respect to changes in parameters β, ε, ψ, ζ, bL and bH . As before, we analyze
the case where we change one parameter and keep all other values the same, as well as
the case where after changing one parameter we re-calibrate the model to get the other
parameter values (again, details are given in Appendix B).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the effects of immigration on the native population in
a search and matching model, where search frictions generate unemployment and break
the link between marginal products and wages. Within this framework, we have been
able to explicitly account for the unemployment and wage effects that come from the
impact of immigration on the availability of jobs. Most of the existing contributions to
the immigration literature overlook such effects by adopting a Walrasian market-clearing
determination of wages. Other features of the model we have developed that deserve at-
tention are: heterogeneity in terms of skills, which allows for the analysis of distributional
effects across different skill types; a generalized production technology, which requires
both capital and labor and accounts for the effects of immigration on input prices; dif-
ferential search costs, which can explain the equilibrium wage gap between otherwise
identical native and immigrant workers; imperfect substitutability between native and
immigrant workers of the same type, which makes the marginal products of these two
23The effect on the skilled immigrant workers is unambiguously negative, since both the increase in
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor and the increase in the ratio of the immigrant to unskilled labor
lower their marginal product. For the previous unskilled immigrants, on the one hand, the rise in the
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor raises their marginal product, but, on the other hand, the rise in the
ratio of immigrant to native unskilled labor lowers it. Because immigrant and native labor are imperfect
substitutes (i.e., η < 1) the latter effect is larger so that their marginal product falls.
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labor groups different; directed search on behalf of firms, which contrasts with the previ-
ous results since the effects of immigration through the employment costs disappear; and
finally endogenous skill acquisition on behalf of natives, which gives them the opportunity
to react to the negative pressure of immigration.
Within the confines of our basic model we have shown that the influx of skill-biased
immigration has two countervailing effects on skilled domestic labor. First, it lowers the
marginal product of the skilled labor input, thereby discouraging the creation of skilled
jobs. Second, it makes opening vacancies suited for skilled workers more profitable to
firms, because firms anticipate that they will be able to pay lower wages to immigrants
that have higher search costs. In our calibrated baseline economy, where we let immigrant
and native workers of the same type be perfect substitutes in production, we have found
that the second effect dominates leading to a higher availability of skilled jobs and lower
unemployment among skilled native workers. The higher availability of skilled jobs also
strengthens the workers’ bargaining position in wage setting, which acts to mitigate the
negative effect of the immigration-induced fall in their marginal product on their wages.
With regard to unskilled workers, we found that skill-biased immigration raises their
wages and lowers their unemployment rate, because of their higher marginal product
and the lower employment cost expected by firms. We have shown that these results
are robust under various choices of values for the production-function parameters that
drive the elasticities of substitution between the three inputs, as well as all labor market
institutional parameters. We have also shown that in a calibrated version of the model
where natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes in production, the inflow of skilled
immigrants benefits skilled native workers, not only in terms of employment but also in
terms of wages.
We believe that our framework is suitable for the examination of a number of inter-
esting issues. For example, the impact of immigration in countries with different labor
features and institutions, such as the degree of unionization, the replacement ratio, the
efficiency of the matching function and the workers’ bargaining power, can be analyzed
more systematically. Also, our results apply to the case where immigration is mainly
unskilled (possibly illegal) or biased towards unskilled labor. In that case, skilled labor
always gains both in terms of wages and unemployment. Unskilled labor, on the other
hand, benefits in terms of unemployment but may lose in terms of wages, depending on
the degree of substitutability between immigrants and natives. If, in fact, this leads to a
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negative pressure on unskilled wages but positive on overall income, then it suggests a sys-
tem of transfers from skilled to unskilled native workers accompanied by a less restrictive
immigration policy towards unskilled labor. However, before reaching such a conclusion,
one should also take into account the fact that low-income unskilled immigrants are likely
to use social programs at higher rates than natives and contribute less to them. In other
words, unskilled immigrants may impose a net fiscal burden on the host country. We
leave these as possible extensions, which we plan to undertake in the future.
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Table 1: Parameterization of the baseline model: general case
ε = 0.5 Standard, within the range of estimates in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
β = 0.5 Satisfies the Hosios (1990) condition.
ρ = 0.401, γ = −0.495 Krusell et al. (2000)
Measured from the Data:
r = 0.004 The monthly interest rate. ∗
sH = 0.019, sL = 0.034, The monthly skilled and unskilled separation rates. ∗∗
δ = 0.0061 The monthly depreciation rate. §
IH = 0.036, IL = 0.089 The (normalized) number of skilled and unskilled immigrants. †
n = 0.00071 The monthly growth rate of the native labor force. †
λ = 0.726 The share of unskilled labor force. ‡
Jointly Calibrated to Match:
α = 0.517, x = 0.051 The employment rates of skilled and unskilled workers:
cL = 0.421, cH = 0.556 0.976 and 0.939. ‡
bL = 0.279, bH = 0.449 The capital-output ratio: 1.348. §
hL = 1.182, hH = 4.203 The college-plus wage premium: 61.1%. ‡
ξ = 0.714 The ratio of unemployment to employment income of
0.71% for both skill groups (Hall and Milgrom, 2008).
The unskilled and skilled native-immigrant wage gap:
−19.0% and −18.8%. †
The vacancy to unemployment ratio: 0.620.>
∗ Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis
∗∗ Matched data from the Current Population Survey.
§ Bureau of Economic Analysis.
† Public Use Microdata of the 1990 and 2000 Censuses.
‡ March Current Population Survey.
> Conference Board’s Help-Wanted Index.
42
43 
 
Table 2. The Effects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Influx  
 (Percentage Changes) 
  
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.43 0.53 0.49 0.59 
    -0.69 -0.84 -11.01 -11.00 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    same as natives same as natives 2.87 2.97 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   same as natives same as natives -0.22 -0.11 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   1.50 1.83 23.38 23.36 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.69 -0.70 -0.47 -0.48 
    1.13 -17.32 0.76 -17.26 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    same as natives 2.74 same as natives 2.93 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   same as natives -1.50 same as natives -1.27 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   -2.38 35.42 -1.59 35.29 
     
 Overall Natives 
   -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.15 
   -0.38 -2.31 -8.39 -11.79 
surplus 1 0.15 0.32 0.43 0.60 
surplus 2 0.17 0.47 0.72 1.00 
 Overall 
  0.19 -0.03 -0.18 -0.38 
  -0.60 -2.71 -8.45 -12.10 
  6.87 7.06 7.24 7.41 
surplus 1 6.84 6.69 6.70 6.55 
surplus 2 6.87 6.85 6.98 6.95 
Notes: The variable   indicates the wage rate,   the unemployment rate,   the 
tightness in the labor market, and   the output of the final good. The subscript   
stands for unskilled,   for skilled,   for native and   for immigrant. The term 
“surplus” refers to total income net of the flow cost of vacancies. The measure 
“surplus 1” includes the unemployment benefits, whereas the measure “surplus 2" 
does not. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to  
Production Parameters in the General Model  (                 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
0ρ   1 γ  
( 1,LK LH    
0.5)HK   
0.5ρ   0γ  
( 2,LK LH    
1)HK   
0.5ρ   1 γ  
( 2,LK LH    
0.5)HK   
0ρ   0γ  
( 1,LK LH    
1)HK   
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.73 0.52 0.52 0.75 
    -14.75 -10.26 -10.36 -14.29 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    5.46 2.54 2.59 5.14 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.08 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   31.62 21.73 21.95 30.59 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.50 -0.43 -0.43 -0.53 
    -15.13 -17.89 -17.93 -15.16 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    1.80 3.38 3.41 1.78 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.17 -1.25 -1.25 -1.20 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   30.89 36.60 36.69 30.96 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.01 0.16 0.16 0.03 
   -14.79 -11.26 -11.35 -14.38 
surplus 1 0.55 0.64 0.57 0.65 
surplus 2 1.12 1.01 0.95 1.19 
 Overall 
  -0.38 -0.40 -0.40 -0.37 
  -15.13 -11.56 -11.65 -14.72 
  7.72 7.34 7.35 7.68 
surplus 1 6.64 6.53 6.52 6.66 
surplus 2 7.21 6.90 6.89 7.19 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 4. The Effects of a Skill-Balanced Immigration 
(Percentage Changes)  
Unskilled Natives Skilled Natives 
    0.13     0.26 
    -11.54     -14.91 
Unskilled Immigrants Skilled Immigrants 
    2.52     3.37 
    same as natives     same as natives 
Overall Unskilled Overall Skilled 
   -0.65    -0.38 
   same as natives    same as natives 
    
   24.49    30.50 
Overall Natives Overall 
   0.14   -0.58 
   -11.97   -11.97 
surplus 1 0.58 surplus 1 6.35 
surplus 2 0.98 surplus 2 6.73 
    7.18 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Elasticity of 
Substitution between Unskilled Natives and Immigrants 
  
(Percentage Changes)  
  
                                                        
  Unskilled Natives 
    1.48 1.55 1.64 
    -14.70 -14.99 -15.29 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    20.69 12.69 6.36 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -3.24 -3.08 -2.92 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives 
    
   31.69 32.32 32.99 
    
 Skilled Natives 
    -1.58 -1.49 -1.40 
    -18.96 -19.04 -19.12 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    2.92 3.08 3.24 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -2.52 -2.44 -2.34 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives 
    
   38.82 38.99 39.16 
    
 Overall Natives 
   0.17 0.24 0.32 
   -15.17 -15.43 -15.71 
surplus 1 0.66 0.73 0.80 
surplus 2 1.40 1.49 1.59 
 Overall 
  -2.75 -2.63 -2.50 
  -15.50 -15.77 -16.05 
  5.70 5.85 6.01 
surplus 1 4.34 4.46 4.59 
surplus 2 5.01 5.15 5.31 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the  Elasticity of  
Substitution between Skilled and Unskilled Natives and Immigrants 
(Percentage Changes)  
  
       
       
           
           
       
       
           
           
       
       
             
           
       
       
           
           
       
       
           
             
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.21 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.33 
    -16.45 -16.78 -17.15 -16.56 -16.68 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    35.38 21.35 11.64 36.35 37.39 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.68 -4.53 -4.36 -4.62 -4.55 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   35.69 36.44 37.25 35.94 36.20 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    0.20 0.29 0.39 0.28 0.39 
    -22.05 -22.14 -22.24 -22.20 -22.36 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    41.27 42.42 43.67 25.20 13.67 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.05 -5.95 -5.85 -5.87 -5.69 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   45.27 45.46 45.66 45.58 45.90 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.13 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.27 
   -17.06 -17.37 -17.70 -17.18 -17.30 
surplus 1 0.51 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.65 
surplus 2 1.52 1.62 1.73 1.60 1.69 
 Overall 
  -5.09 -4.97 -4.83 -4.99 -4.88 
  -17.40 -17.71 -18.04 -17.52 -17.64 
  3.83 3.99 4.16 3.94 4.07 
surplus 1 2.07 2.18 2.31 2.16 2.27 
surplus 2 2.91 3.06 3.22 3.02 3.14 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 7.  The Effects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Influx with 
Endogenous Human Capital Accumulation 
(Percentage Changes)  
Unskilled Natives  Skilled Natives 
    0.37     -0.13 
    -10.78     -17.65 
Unskilled Immigrants Skilled Immigrants 
    2.66     3.42 
    same as natives     same as natives 
Overall Unskilled Overall Skilled 
   -0.33    -0.92 
   same as natives    same as natives 
    
   22.89    36.10 
Overall Natives Overall 
   0.02   -0.48 
   -11.46   -11.81 
surplus 1 0.47 surplus 1 6.45 
surplus 2 0.86 surplus 2 6.83 
  0.32   7.30 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 8. The Effects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Influx -  
Separate Labor Markets for Immigrants and Natives 
   (Percentage Changes)  
  
       
       
           
           
       
       
           
           
       
       
             
           
       
       
           
           
       
       
           
             
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.23 0.31 0.41 0.30 0.38 
    -1.38 -2.11 -3.11 -1.85 -2.44 
      
    3.40 5.25 7.87 4.56 6.06 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -2.84 -5.69 -8.34 -2.73 -2.59 
    0.11 0.24 0.39 0.10 0.10 
      
    -0.23 -0.50 -0.80 -0.22 -0.20 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.89 -4.77 -4.65 -4.83 -4.75 
   -6.29 -7.06 -8.10 -6.76 -7.36 
 Skilled Natives 
    0.01 0.11 0.23 0.09 0.18 
    -0.07 -1.08 -2.48 -0.97 -2.23 
      
    0.15 2.48 5.72 2.22 5.19 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -3.74 -3.59 -3.41 -7.16 -10.38 
    0.06 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.20 
      
    -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.25 -0.40 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.42 -6.33 -6.23 -6.30 -6.18 
   -7.34 -8.38 -9.79 -8.28 -9.58 
 Overall Natives 
   0.11 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.28 
   -1.12 -1.91 -2.99 -1.67 -2.40 
surplus 1 0.31 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.46 
surplus 2 0.54 0.81 1.19 0.74 1.01 
 Overall 
  -5.33 -5.24 -5.14 -5.24 -5.13 
  -6.66 -7.48 -8.60 -7.22 -7.96 
  3.33 3.66 4.10 3.57 3.88 
surplus 1 2.23 2.35 2.47 2.32 2.42 
surplus 2 2.60 2.93 3.35 2.84 3.14 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Figure1. The Structure of the Basic Model 
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Figure 2.  Existence and Uniqueness in the Basic Model – An Increase in 
High-Skill Immigration when There Are No Search Costs with and 
without Endogenous Skill Acquisition  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  An Increase in High-Skill Immigration when There Are Search  
Costs and Perfect Substitutability with and without Endogenous Skill 
Acquisition  
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Appendix A: Derivations and Proofs
(A major portion of this Appendix is not intended for publication)
Derivation of equations (14)-(17). The change in the number of unemployed skilled workers
(UH = UHN + UHI) is given by the difference between the sum of new births (n(1− λ+ IH))
and break-ups (sHYH) and the sum of deaths (nUH) and matches (m(θH)UH) of skilled workers;
that is,
U˙H = n(1− λ+ IH) + sHYH − [nUH +m(θH)UH ],
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. Setting U˙H equal to zero and using the
identity YH +UH = 1−λ+ IH yields equation (14) in the main text. The other equations follow
similarly.
Derivation of the system of equations (20)-(22). Using (1) and (2), equations (3), (4)
and (5) can be written as
pL = α
{
α+ (1− α)
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] ρ
γ
(
YH
YL
)ρ} 1−ρρ
, (A1)
pH = (1− α)(1− x)
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] 1−γ
γ

α
(
YH
YL
)−ρ
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] ρ
γ
+ (1− α)

1−ρ
ρ
, (A2)
and
pK = (1− α)x
[
x+ (1− x)
(
K
YH
)−γ] 1−γγ 
α
(
YH
YL
)−ρ
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] ρ
γ
+ (1− α)

1−ρ
ρ
, (A3)
respectively. Taking the ratio of (A2) to (A3) we have
pH
pK
=
1− x
x
(
K
YH
)1−γ
, where pK = r + δ. (A4)
Moreover, taking the ratio of equations (14) and (15), we get
YH
YL
=
m(θH)[n+ sL +m(θL)](1− λ+ IH)
m(θL)[n+ sH +m(θH)](λ+ IL)
. (A5)
Combining (7), (10) and (12) we obtain
Sij =
1
1− β
pi − wij
n+ r + si
. (A6)
1
Next, subtracting (8) from (9) and using (13) and (A6) yields the expression for the wage rates
(equation 22). Moreover, substitute (22) in (A6) to get
Sij =
pi − bi + hij
n+ r + si + βm(θi)
. (A7)
Substituting (12) and (A7) in (6), after taking into account the free entry condition (10), yields
pi = Bi, where Bi ≡ bi − (1− φi)hiI + ci[n+ r + si + βm(θi)]
(1− β)q(θi) (A8)
and by assumption hiN = 0 for i = H,L. Combining equations (A1), (A5) and (A8) yields (20),
where the expression for k follows from (A4) and (A8). Similarly, combining (A2), (A5) and
(A8) yields (21).
Derivation of equation (23). Substituting (13) and (A7) in (8) we get
(r + n)JUij =
βm(θi)pi + (n+ r + si)(bi − hij)
n+ r + si + βm(θi)
. (A11)
Next rewrite (22) taking into account (A11) to obtain (23).
Proof of Proposition 1. Combining equations (20) and (21), we arrive at the following
equation (
BL
α
) ρ
1−ρ − α
1− α =
α[
BH
(1−α)(1−x) [xk
γ + (1− x)] γ−1γ
] ρ
1−ρ − (1− α)
, (A9)
where BL, BH and k are defined in the main text. Simple differentiation shows that BH and
k are both increasing functions of θH . On the other hand, BL is an increasing function of θL.
Rearranging equation (A9) we obtain
X =
αΨ
Ψ− (1− α) , (A10)
where
X ≡
(
BL
α
) ρ
1−ρ
and Ψ ≡
[
BH
(1− α)(1− x) [xk
γ + (1− x)] γ−1γ
] ρ
1−ρ
.
Equation (A10) defines a locus of θH and θL along which a firm is indifferent between opening
a low-skill and a high-skill vacancy. This locus, which is labeled EP in Figure 2, has negative
slope:
dθL
dθH
|EP =
− α(1−α)
[Ψ−(1−α)]2
dΨ
dBH
dBH
dθH
dX
dBL
dBL
dθL
< 0.
Moreover, equation (21) defines a locus of θH and θL along which a high-skill vacancy has zero
expected profit. This locus, which is labeled as OH in Figure 2, has the following properties:
lim
θH→0
θL = 0, lim
θH→θH
θL =∞, where θH <∞, dθL
dθH
|OH =
dBH
dθH
− ∂pH∂θH
∂pH
∂θL
> 0,
where pH is equal to the (LHS) of (21) and hence ∂pH/∂θH < 0. Equations (21) and (A10)
determine the equilibrium values of θH and θL. To ensure an intersection of the EP and OH
2
curves in the positive orthant we must impose conditions that guarantee that the intercept of
the EP curve is positive. One can easily show that Ψ0 ≡ limθH→0 Ψ(θH) < ∞ and X0 ≡
limθL→0X(θL) <∞. Moreover,
lim
θL→∞
X(θL) =
{ ∞ if ρ > 0
0 if ρ < 0
and
dX(θL)
dθL
=
{
> 0 if ρ > 0
< 0 if ρ < 0
.
Given these properties, existence and uniqueness is ensured if
0 < (X0)
1
ρ <
[
αΨ0
Ψ0 − (1− α)
] 1
ρ
.
Condition 1. A firm that meets a native worker of type i will decide to establish an employment
relation if JFiN ≥ JVi . Using equations (7) and (10) then it must be the case that pi ≥ wiN , which
using equation (22) can be written as pi ≥ bi. Finally, using equation (A8) we get the condition
given in the main text.
Derivation of equation (24). If hij = 0 then equation (22) implies that wij = wi and equation
(7) that JFij = J
F
i ∀j. It follows then from equations (6) and (10) that
JFi =
ci
q(θi)
.
On the other hand, (7) and (10) imply
JFi =
pi − wi
(n+ r + si)
.
Combining the last two equations yields
wi = pi − (n+ r + si) ci
q(θi)
, i = H,L,
and, after using (A8), (24).
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating equations (21) and (A10) we obtain
dθH
dIH
=
−1ρ dXdBL
dBL
dθL
∂pH
∂Λ
∂Λ
∂IH
D1
< 0 and
dθL
dIH
=
1
ρ
α(1−α)
[Ψ−(1−α)]2
dΨ
dBH
dBH
dθH
∂pH
∂Λ
∂Λ
∂IH
D1
> 0,
where
D1 =
1
ρ
dX
dBL
dBL
dθL
(
dpH
dθH
− ∂BH
∂θH
)
− 1
ρ
α(1− α)
[Ψ− (1− α)]2
dΨ
dBH
dBH
dθH
∂pH
∂θL
< 0.
The results regarding the unemployment variables (uHN and uLN ) and the wage rates (wH
and wL) follow immediately from equations (16)-(17) and (24). Finally, the results regarding a
change in IL follow similarly.
Proof of Proposition 3. If ρ = 1 then equation (20) and (21) become independent of each
other. More specifically, (20) simplifies to α = BL, which determines θL as a function of IL alone.
Similarly, equation (21) simplifies to (1− α) (1− x) [xkγ + (1− x)] 1−γγ = BH , which determines
3
θH as a function of IH (recall that equations (2) and (5) imply that k assumes a constant value).
Simple differentiation then shows that
dθH
dIH
=
1− λ
(1− λ+ IH)2
hLH
D2
> 0,
where
D2 =
cH
1− β
βm′(θH)q(θH)− q′(θH)[n+ r + sH + βm(θH)]
[q(θH)]2
> 0
The results regarding the unemployment variables (uHj and uLj) and the wage rates (wHj and
wLj) follow immediately from equations (16)-(17) and (22). Finally, the results regarding a
change in IL follow similarly after differentiating (20).
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 3 and thus omitted.
Expressing the marginal products in Subsection 6.2 as functions of θi’s. Using equa-
tions (1), (2), (25) and (26), we find Y/YL as a function of θi. Specifically,
Y
YL
=
[
α+ (1− α)
(
Q
YL
)ρ] 1ρ
,
Q
YL
=
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] 1
γ YH
YL
,
K
YH
=
k[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
YHI
YHN
)ν]1/ν = k[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
IH
1−λ
)ν]1/ν
where
k ≡ K
YHN
,
YH
YL
=
[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
IH
1−λ
)ν]1/ν
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
IL
λ
)η]1/η AHAL 1− λλ ,
since, in steady state, YLN= ALλ, YLI= ALIL, YHN= AH(1− λ), and YHI= AHIH (recall
that Ai= m(θi)/[n+ si+m(θi)]). Moreover, using (5) and (28), we have
pK
pHN
=
x
(1− x)ζ
kγ−1(
YH
YHN
)γ−ν
or
k = (pHN )
1
1−γ
[
x
(1− x)ζ(r + δ)
] 1
1−γ
(
YH
YHN
) γ−ν
γ−1
or
k = (pHN )
1
1−γ
[
x
(1− x)ζ(r + δ)
] 1
1−γ
(
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
IH
1− λ
)ν) γ−ν(γ−1)ν
.
Also,
YL
YLN
=
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
YLI
YLN
)η] 1η
=
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
IL
λ
)η] 1η
.
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Using all the above equations, we can express, through consecutive substitutions, pLN as a
function of the matching rates m(θi) and hence the tightness prevailing in each market θi.
Notice, from equation (29), that to express pLI as a function of the matching rates we need
only one additional ratio
YL
YLI
=
[
ψ
(
YLI
YLN
)−η
+ (1− ψ)
] 1
η
=
[
ψ
(
IL
λ
)−η
+ (1− ψ)
] 1
η
since
YLI
YLN
=
IL
λ
.
Similarly, for pHN we need to compute the following ratios
Y
Q
=
[
α
(
Q
YL
)−ρ
+ (1− α)
] 1
ρ
,
Q
YH
=
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] 1
γ
,
YH
YHN
=
[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
YHI
YHN
)ν] 1ν
=
[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
IH
1− λ
)ν] 1ν
.
Finally, to express pHI as a function of the matching rates we need only one additional ratio
YH
YHI
=
[
ζ
(
YHI
YHN
)−ν
+ (1− ζ)
] 1
ν
=
[
ζ
(
IH
1− λ
)−ν
+ (1− ζ)
] 1
ν
.
Proof of Proposition 5. If ρ = 1 then the two equations described by (31) become independent
of each other. To find the effect of a change in IH on θH differentiate (31) when i = H, using
the equations that express pij as functions of θi (derived above). The results regarding the
unemployment variables (uHj and uLj) and the wage rates (wHj and wLj) follow immediately
from equations (16)-(17) and (22).
Derivation of equation (33). Combining equations (A11) and (32), we get (33).
Proof of Proposition 6. We illustrate the results regarding the effects of a change in IH .
The effects of a change in IL follow similarly. Consider first the effect of a change in θi on λ.
Substituting (20) and (21) in (33) yields
(1− λ)z(r + n) = bH − bL + β
1− β (cHθH − cLθL). (A12)
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Differentiating (A12) we obtain
dλ
dθH
= − 1
z(r + n)
β
1− β cH < 0 and
dλ
dθL
=
1
z(r + n)
β
1− β cL > 0.
a) Next differentiate equations (21) and (A10) to get
dθH
dIH
=
−1ρ dXdBL
dBL
dθL
∂pH
∂Λ
∂Λ
∂IH
D3
< 0 and
dθL
dIH
=
α(1−α)
[Ψ−(1−α)]2
dΨ
dBH
dBH
dθH
∂pH
∂Λ
∂Λ
∂IH
D3
> 0,
where
D3 =
1
ρ
dX
dθL
(
∂pH
∂θH
+
∂pH
∂λ
dλ
dθH
− ∂BH
∂θH
)
− 1
ρ
α(1− α)
[Ψ− (1− α)]2
dΨ
dθH
(
∂pH
∂θL
+
∂pH
∂λ
dλ
dθH
)
< 0.
Comparing these derivatives with the ones derived in Proposition 2, it follows that, starting from
the same equilibrium, the effect of a change in IH is smaller, in absolute value, on both θH and
θL when λ is endogenously determined. The other results follow immediately from equations
(16)-(17) and (24).
b) If ρ = 1 equations (20) and (21) simplify to α = BL and (1− α) (1− x) [xkγ + (1− x)]
1−γ
γ = BH ,
where, as implied by (2) and (5), k is constant. Simple differentiation shows that
dθH
dIH
=
−1
D4
[
∂BL
∂φL
∂φL
∂λ
∂λ
∂θL
+
∂BL
∂θL
]
∂BH
∂φH
∂φH
∂IH
> 0,
dθL
dIH
=
−1
D4
∂BL
∂φL
∂φL
∂λ
∂λ
∂θH
∂BH
∂φH
∂φH
∂IH
> 0,
where
D4=
∂BL
∂φL
∂φL
∂λ
∂λ
∂θL
∂BH
∂θH
+
∂BL
∂θL
∂BH
∂φH
∂φH
∂λ
∂λ
∂θH
+
∂BH
∂θH
∂BL
∂θL
> 0.
Straightforward algebra shows that
dθH
dIH
|λ fixed > dθH
dIH
|λ variable .
The results regarding the unemployment variables and the wage rates follow immediately from
equations (16)-(17) and (22).
Expressing the marginal products in Subsection 6.4 as functions of θij ’s. The pro-
cedure is similar to that outlined above for the case considered in Subsection 6.2, i.e., the case
where immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes but search in the same market. Using
equations (1), (2), (25) and (26), we find Y/YL as a function of θi. Specifically,
Y
YL
=
[
α+ (1− α)
(
Q
YL
)ρ] 1ρ
,
Q
YL
=
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] 1
γ YH
YL
,
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KYH
=
k[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
YHI
YHN
)ν]1/ν = k[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
AHI
AHN
)ν (
IH
1−λ
)ν]1/ν
where
k ≡ K
YHN
, Aij ≡ m(θij)
n+ si +m(θij)
,
and
YH
YL
=
[ζ (AHN (1− λ))ν + (1− ζ) (AHIIH)ν ]1/ν
[ψ (ALNλ)
η + (1− ψ) (ALIIL)η]1/η
,
since, in steady state,
YLN = ALNλ, YLI = ALIIL, YHN = AHN (1− λ), and YHI = AHIIH .
Moreover, using (5) and (28), we have
pK
pHN
=
x
(1− x)ζ
kγ−1(
YH
YHN
)γ−ν
or
k = (pHN )
1
1−γ
[
x
(1− x)ζ(r + δ)
] 1
1−γ
(
YH
YHN
) γ−ν
γ−1
or
k = (pHN )
1
1−γ
[
x
(1− x)ζ(r + δ)
] 1
1−γ
(
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
AHI
AHN
)ν ( IH
1− λ
)ν) γ−ν(γ−1)ν
.
Also,
YL
YLN
=
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
YLI
YLN
)η] 1η
=
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
ALI
ALN
)η (IL
λ
)η] 1η
.
Finally, using all the above equations, we can express, through consecutive substitutions, pLN
as a function of the matching rates m(θij) and hence the tightness prevailing in each market
θij .
Notice, from equation (29), that to express pLI as a function of the matching rates we need
only one additional ratio
YL
YLI
=
[
ψ
(
YLI
YLN
)−η
+ (1− ψ)
] 1
η
=
[
ψ
(
ALI
ALN
)−η (IL
λ
)−η
+ (1− ψ)
] 1
η
since
YLI
YLN
=
ALI
ALN
IL
λ
.
Similarly, for pHN we need to compute the following ratios
Y
Q
=
[
α
(
Q
YL
)−ρ
+ (1− α)
] 1
ρ
Q
YH
=
[
x
(
K
YH
)γ
+ (1− x)
] 1
γ
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YH
YHN
=
[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
YHI
YHN
)ν] 1ν
=
[
ζ + (1− ζ)
(
AHI
AHN
)ν ( IH
1− λ
)ν] 1ν
.
Finally, to express pHI as a function of the matching rates we need only one additional ratio
YH
YHI
=
[
ζ
(
YHI
YHN
)−ν
+ (1− ζ)
] 1
ν
=
[
ζ
(
AHI
AHN
)−ν ( IH
1− λ
)−ν
+ (1− ζ)
] 1
ν
.
Proof of Proposition 7. If ρ = 1, then the markets for high-skill and low-skill workers are
independent. This follows from the four equations (35), which form two independent systems
consisting of two equations each. Moreover, each system describes the interdependence between
native and immigrant workers of the same skill. Simple differentiation yields the results regarding
θij . The effects on the unemployment and the wage rates follow then immediately from equations
(16)-(17) and (22), respectively, where θij replaces θi.
Appendix B: Further Sensitivity Analysis
(not intended for publication)
In this Appendix we present further sensitivity analysis to show that our results are not
sensitive to any of the assumed or borrowed values from the literature as well as to our measure
of separation rates.
Separation rates: sH andand sL
The separation rates we used in our simulations include transitions from employment to
both unemployment and inactivity. Next we also examine how the results would change if we
define job separations as transitions to unemployment only. Based on matched data from the
CPS we find that the monthly transition rate from employment to unemployment for skilled
workers is 0.006 and for unskilled workers is 0.014. In Table B1 we show that the results in
all the specifications are essentially unchanged when we calibrate the general model using these
values for the separations rates (sH and sL, respectively) (compare columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 in
Table B1 with the last column in Table 2, Table 7, column 2 in Table 6 and column 2 in Table
8, respectively).
Replacement ratio
We also examine whether the results would change if we replaced our targeted replacement
ratio of 0.71, with Shimer’s replacement ratio of 0.40. As mentioned above, the first includes
both unemployment insurance and the value of non-market activity, while the latter includes
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only unemployment insurance. In Table B2 we show that results do not change in any significant
way (again compare columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Table B2 with the last column in Table 2, Table
7, column 2 in Table 6 and column 2 in Table 8, respectively). Higher value of the replacement
ratio tend to amplify the response of job creation as shown in the tables. This is because higher
replacement ratio means smaller net profits to the firms, so that shocks have a larger impact in
percentage terms on net profits and thus on job creation.
Production elasticity parameters: ρ and γ
Next we examine how the results would change if the parameters of the general model were
jointly calibrated assuming values for the production elasticity parameters ρ and γ different
from those in Krusell et al. (2000). The results of this test are summarized in Table B3. We
calibrate the parameters of the general model for each of the different sets of values in the table.
Comparing the results in Table B3 with those reported in the last column of Table 2 shows that
our results are not sensitive to our choices of values for these parameters.
Bargaining power: β
In Tables B4 and B5 we show that our results are not qualitatively sensitive to changes
in the value of β, the workers’ bargaining power. We calibrate the parameters of the general
model at β = 0.35 and β = 0.65 and then derive results for all the specifications using the new
parameter values.
Unemployment elasticity of the matching function: ε
Likewise, in Tables B6 and B7 we show that our results are not qualitatively sensitive to
changes in the value of ε. Again, we calibrate the parameters of the general model at ε=0.35
and ε=0.65 and show that the results in all the specifications are qualitatively unaffected.
Sensitivity of Calibration Results with respect to ψ, ζ, β, ε, bL and bH .
We also examine the sensitivity of the results presented in the main text. In contrast to the
results presented above here we do not re-calibrate; instead, we keep all other parameters as
given in Table 1.
In Tables B8 and B9 we examine how robust our results are to changes in the values of ψ
and ζ in the imperfect-substitutes and separate-markets models, respectively. Given that we
do not re-calibrate we cannot use values less than 0.72, because the condition regarding the
option to wait ceases to be satisfied. Also, we cannot use values higher than 0.85 because either
the skilled or the unskilled immigrant wage turns negative. By increasing ψ and ζ we lower
the wages of immigrants while the search cost remains the same. This is why we get negative
immigrant wages. The results are not sensitive to changes in these parameter values within the
9
specified range.
In our benchmark calibration we follow common practice in taking the bargaining power
parameter, β, to be equal to 0.5. In Tables B10-B12 we show the results do not change in any
fundamental way when we use alternative values for β. Also, as shown in Tables B13-B15 in all
the specifications the results are qualitatively robust to our choices of values for ε.
Finally, in Tables B16-B18 and B19-B21, we examine the sensitivity of the results with
respect to changes in the unemployment income of unskilled (bL) and skilled workers (bH),
respectively. At higher values of bi the wage and expected employment cost of type i are higher.
This explains why the response of job creation to immigration is higher at higher values of bi.
Appendix C: Transitional Dynamics
(not intended for publication)
Figure C1 presents the dynamic adjustment in our basic model. The experiment is the
following. We let the number of skilled and unskilled immigrants increase by 0.022% and 0.042%,
respectively, of the native labor force each month for a period of 10 years. Thus, the total skilled
and unskilled immigration is 2.6% and 5.1%, just as during the period 2000-2009 in the United
States. As shown in Figure C1, the simulation results of the dynamic model are in accord
with the steady-steady results that are presented in the last column of Table 2. Job creation
increases in both sectors and unemployment falls for both skill groups. The unskilled-native
wage increases because of both higher θL (outside option) and higher pL. The skilled native
wage falls because pH falls. Also, once the immigration shock ceases to exist the economy settles
quickly to the new steady-state values.
Initially, when the stock of immigrants is still small, the response of job creation to immigra-
tion is larger (the slopes of θL and θH are steeper). This suggests that the marginal benefit of
additional immigrants on the receiving country is larger when the number of existing immigrants
is small. (Note that the increase in pL is steeper at the beginning; this may also contribute to
the steeper response of job creation). When immigrants stop entering the country, job creation
in both sectors starts decreasing. This is because firms no longer benefit from lower employment
costs. As soon as immigrants stop entering then the probability that an unemployed worker
is immigrant stops increasing. So, firms start reducing the number of vacancies they post and
unemployment starts increasing. Subsequently, once unemployment is high enough, firms ben-
efit from higher arrival rates of unemployed workers and thus lower vacancy costs, so vacancies
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start increasing slightly. Eventually, vacancies settle to a level that is higher than their initial
level. For this reason, once immigrants stop entering, the tightness in each of the two markets
starts falling, but never goes below its initial level. Accordingly, the unemployment rates keep
falling as new immigrants enter country, start increasing when immigrants stop entering, and
eventually settle to levels lower than their initial levels.
Wages follow a similar pattern. For example, the wages of unskilled natives increase faster
at the beginning and then slow down. Subsequently, when the inflow of immigrants disappears,
wages start falling because the workers’ outside option starts deteriorating. However, because
tightness eventually settles to a higher level, the workers’ value of outside option remains higher
than what it was before immigrants started entering. Thus, their wages settle to a higher level
than their original level. On the other hand, the wages of skilled natives settle at a lower level
than the initial one, because of the increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor (skill-biased
immigration influx).
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Table B1. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect 
 to the Separation Rates  
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
General Model 
General Model 
Endogenous 
Human Capital 
Imperfect 
Substitutes 
         
Separate 
Markets 
         
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.60 0.40 0.23 0.23 
    -10.40 -10.19 -16.04 -1.35 
     
    22.08 21.63 34.93 3.30 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    2.83 2.54 33.04 -2.86 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.13 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.27 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.12 -0.32 -4.69 -4.88 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -6.16 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.44 -0.12 0.22 0.01 
    -15.75 -16.13 -21.77 -0.05 
     
    32.21 32.99 44.77 0.12 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    2.63 3.08 43.02 -3.80 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.09 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.17 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.28 -0.96 -6.10 -6.39 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -7.20 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.30   
   0.17 0.06 0.14 0.11 
   -11.08 -10.77 -16.69 -1.11 
surplus 1 0.78 0.66 0.75 0.46 
surplus 2 1.16 1.03 1.79 0.70 
 Overall 
  -0.39 -0.48 -5.12 -5.32 
  -11.38 -11.11 -17.02 -6.54 
  7.38 7.27 3.85 3.28 
surplus 1 6.64 6.54 2.26 2.35 
surplus 2 7.01 6.90 3.11 2.70 
Notes: The table shows results when we set          and           and then 
recalibrate the model to obtain some of the other parameter values as described in 
Sub-section 5.1. 
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Table B2. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the 
 Targeted Replacement Ratio 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
General Model 
General Model 
Endogenous 
Human Capital 
Imperfect 
Substitutes 
         
Separate 
Markets 
         
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.70 0.48 0.56 0.30 
    -7.61 -7.45 -9.14 -0.30 
     
    16.17 15.84 19.69 0.67 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    2.44 2.15 17.40 -3.15 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.10 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.20 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.08 -0.31 -4.60 -4.56 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -3.92 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.45 -0.10 0.20 -0.11 
    -13.83 -14.15 -16.45 0.11 
     
    28.29 28.95 33.75 -0.24 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    2.32 2.80 29.77 -4.12 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.06 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.12 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.34 -0.99 -6.31 -6.21 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -5.80 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.32   
   0.24 0.12 0.39 0.14 
   -8.39 -8.12 -10.00 -0.24 
surplus 1 0.78 0.65 0.92 0.35 
surplus 2 0.95 0.81 1.25 0.37 
 Overall 
  -0.38 -0.48 -5.09 -5.02 
  -8.70 -8.46 -10.33 -4.46 
  7.26 7.15 3.34 2.90 
surplus 1 6.63 6.52 2.17 2.14 
surplus 2 6.79 6.68 2.38 2.13 
Notes: The table shows results when we set our targeted replacement ratio to 0.40. We 
keep all other targets the same and recalibrate the general model as described in Sub-
section 5.1. 
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Table B3. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to Production 
Parameters in the General Model 
 
(Percentage Changes)  
  
0ρ   1 γ  
( 1,LK LH    
0.5)HK   
0.5ρ   0γ  
( 2,LK LH    
1)HK   
0.5ρ   1 γ  
( 2,LK LH    
0.5)HK   
0ρ   0γ  
( 1,LK LH    
1)HK   
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.84 0.52 0.53 0.83 
    -11.17 -10.96 -10.96 -11.16 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    3.30 2.88 2.88 3.29 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   0.15 -0.18 -0.18 0.15 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   23.70 23.27 23.27 23.69 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.89 -0.38 -0.38 -0.88 
    -17.12 -17.29 -17.29 -17.12 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    2.42 3.06 3.05 2.43 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.69 -1.16 -1.16 -1.68 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   35.01 35.36 35.36 35.01 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 
   -11.92 -11.76 -11.76 -11.91 
surplus 1 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.59 
surplus 2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
 Overall 
  -0.39 -0.38 -0.38 -0.39 
  -12.23 -12.07 -12.07 -12.22 
  7.41 7.41 7.41 7.41 
surplus 1 6.55 6.55 6.56 6.54 
surplus 2 6.95 6.95 6.95 6.94 
Notes: The table shows results when we change the values of   and    and then 
recalibrate the general model to obtain some of the other parameter values as 
described in Sub-section 5.1. 
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Table B4. Calibration Results with        
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
General Model 
General Model 
Endogenous 
Human Capital 
Imperfect 
Substitutes 
         
Separate 
Markets 
         
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.66 0.45 0.31 0.22 
    -8.30 -8.05 -13.53 -1.29 
     
    17.63 17.09 29.80 3.07 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    2.45 2.14 22.36 -2.90 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.23 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.47 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.12 -0.33 -4.68 -4.80 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -5.67 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.44 -0.09 0.21 -0.02 
    -14.22 -14.64 -21.20 0.14 
     
    29.08 29.95 43.66 -0.30 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    2.35 2.84 45.83 -3.88 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.12 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.24 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.32 -0.97 -6.17 -6.36 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -6.81 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.32   
   0.22 0.10 0.20 0.10 
   -9.04 -8.70 -14.34 -1.03 
surplus 1 0.64 0.51 0.58 0.31 
surplus 2 0.96 0.82 1.59 0.48 
 Overall 
  -0.40 -0.49 -5.14 -5.25 
  -9.35 -9.04 -14.69 -6.06 
  7.29 7.17 3.83 3.18 
surplus 1 6.50 6.39 2.08 2.20 
surplus 2 6.81 6.69 2.87 2.42 
Notes: The table shows results when we set        and then recalibrate the 
general model to obtain some of the other parameter values as described in Sub-
section 5.1. 
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Table B5. Calibration Results with        
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
General Model 
General Model 
Endogenous 
Human Capital 
Imperfect 
Substitutes 
         
Separate 
Markets 
         
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.51 0.29 0.18 0.23 
    -13.57 -13.38 -17.83 -1.42 
     
    28.78 28.38 38.31 3.65 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    3.43 3.13 36.22 -2.76 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.06 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.11 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.12 -0.34 -4.61 -5.02 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -6.65 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.50 -0.16 0.17 0.03 
    -19.49 -19.86 -22.47 -0.27 
     
    39.86 40.61 46.03 0.63 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    3.35 3.83 37.04 -3.65 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.03 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.06 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.22 -0.87 -6.00 -6.56 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -7.76 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.32   
   0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.12 
   -14.32 -14.02 -18.37 -1.18 
surplus 1 0.56 0.43 0.46 0.30 
surplus 2 1.04 0.90 1.41 0.62 
 Overall 
  -0.38 -0.48 -5.02 -5.47 
  -14.63 -14.36 -18.69 -7.02 
  7.52 7.41 3.77 3.52 
surplus 1 6.60 6.49 2.08 2.26 
surplus 2 7.07 6.96 2.90 2.82 
Notes: The table shows results when we set        and then recalibrate the 
general model to obtain some of the other parameter values as described in Sub-
section 5.1. 
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Table B6. Calibration Results with        
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
General Model 
General Model 
Endogenous 
Human Capital 
Imperfect 
Substitutes 
         
Separate 
Markets 
         
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.55 0.31 0.25 0.25 
    -7.56 -7.40 -11.32 -1.04 
    22.95 22.46 34.87 3.43 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    2.24 1.93 16.88 -3.10 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.08 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.22 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.25 -0.48 -4.74 -4.78 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -5.13 
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.55 -0.18 0.07 -0.04 
    -11.97 -12.26 -15.23 0.26 
     
    35.00 35.85 44.65 -0.79 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    1.83 2.34 23.15 -4.29 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.04 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.12 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.50 -1.13 -6.43 -6.46 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -6.12 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.34   
   0.10 -0.03 0.13 0.12 
   -8.12 -7.83 -11.77 -0.82 
surplus 1 0.52 0.39 0.48 0.33 
surplus 2 0.81 0.66 1.13 0.45 
 Overall 
  -0.55 -0.65 -5.24 -5.26 
  -8.42 -8.16 -12.10 -5.52 
  7.24 7.12 3.44 3.05 
surplus 1 6.37 6.25 1.92 2.08 
surplus 2 6.64 6.52 2.37 2.18 
Notes: The table shows results when we set        and then recalibrate the 
general model to obtain some of the other parameter values as described in Sub-
section 5.1. 
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Table B7. Calibration Results with        
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
General Model 
General Model 
Endogenous 
Human Capital 
Imperfect 
Substitutes 
         
Separate 
Markets 
         
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.63 0.42 0.17 0.22 
    -14.57 -14.29 -21.81 -1.80 
     
    23.76 23.31 36.68 3.82 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    3.69 3.39 69.93 -2.63 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.14 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.22 
 Overall Unskilled 
   0.02 -0.19 -4.61 -5.20 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -7.22 
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.41 -0.08 0.37 0.06 
    -22.63 -23.11 -29.09 -0.77 
     
    35.57 36.34 45.97 1.50 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    3.98 4.45 64.78 -3.37 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives 0.08 
     
    same as natives same as natives same as natives -0.12 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.04 -0.71 -5.61 -6.68 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives -8.47 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.30   
   0.19 0.08 0.12 0.11 
   -15.57 -15.22 -22.57 -1.57 
surplus 1 0.67 0.54 0.55 0.29 
surplus 2 1.18 1.05 1.98 0.84 
 Overall 
  -0.22 -0.31 -4.92 -5.63 
  -15.89 -15.56 -22.92 -7.60 
  7.58 7.47 4.29 3.95 
surplus 1 6.74 6.64 2.23 2.36 
surplus 2 7.26 7.15 3.55 3.33 
Notes: The table shows results when we set        and then recalibrate the general 
model to obtain some of the other parameter values as described in Sub-section 5.1. 
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Table B8. Sensitivity with respect to  the Production Parameters 
  and    in the Imperfect-Substitutes Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
 
        
        
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.21 0.39 0.06 0.23 
    -16.45 -14.85 -15.90 -14.36 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    35.38 93.76 30.61 72.85 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.68 -5.02 -4.83 -5.17 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   35.69 32.13 34.48 31.04 
 Skilled Natives 
    0.20 -0.06 0.46 0.20 
    -22.05 -21.57 -21.28 -20.82 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    41.27 35.56 133.83 99.19 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.05 -6.30 -6.51 -6.76 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   45.27 44.28 43.68 42.71 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 
   -17.06 -15.61 -16.49 -15.09 
surplus 1 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.53 
surplus 2 1.52 1.40 1.46 1.34 
 Overall 
  -5.09 -5.38 -5.37 -5.65 
  -17.40 -15.94 -16.83 -15.42 
  3.83 3.35 3.47 3.01 
surplus 1 2.07 1.79 1.81 1.53 
surplus 2 2.91 2.47 2.57 2.15 
Notes: The table shows results of the model where immigrants and natives of the 
same type are imperfect substitutes in production when we change the values of   
and  . We keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B9. Sensitivity with respect to the Production Parameters 
  and    in the Separate-Markets Model  
 
(Percentage Changes) 
 
 
        
        
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.23 0.33 0.10 0.20 
    -1.38 -1.32 -0.50 -0.71 
    3.40 3.10 1.22 1.66 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -2.84 -3.03 -3.04 -3.25 
    0.11 0.08 0.12 0.09 
    -0.23 -0.17 -0.25 -0.19 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.89 -5.20 -4.96 -5.30 
   -6.29 -5.93 -5.34 -5.27 
 Skilled Natives 
    0.01 -0.22 0.18 -0.03 
    -0.07 1.37 -0.95 0.14 
     
    0.15 -3.05 2.09 -0.31 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -3.74 -4.04 -3.90 -4.19 
    0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 
     
    -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.10 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.42 -6.51 -6.84 -6.97 
   -7.34 -5.76 -7.96 -6.75 
 Overall Natives 
   0.11 0.09 0.13 0.09 
   -1.12 -0.78 -0.58 -0.56 
surplus 1 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.26 
surplus 2 0.54 0.39 0.41 0.34 
 Overall 
  -5.33 -5.55 -5.53 -5.78 
  -6.66 -6.05 -6.00 -5.73 
  3.33 2.72 2.84 2.35 
surplus 1 2.23 1.89 1.95 1.62 
surplus 2 2.60 2.04 2.15 1.70 
Notes: The table shows results of the model where immigrants and natives 
search in different labor markets when we change the values of   and  . We 
keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B10. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the 
 Bargaining Share in the General Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
 
  
                              
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.44 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.64 
    -10.39 -10.65 -10.84 -11.00 -11.17 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    1.42 1.88 2.37 2.97 3.75 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   0.11 0.05 -0.02 -0.11 -0.22 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   23.36 23.30 23.31 23.36 23.45 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.48 -0.49 -0.49 -0.48 -0.46 
    -17.20 -17.21 -17.23 -17.26 -17.30 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    1.09 1.61 2.20 2.93 3.90 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -0.87 -1.00 1.13 -1.27 -1.43 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   35.97 35.61 35.41 35.29 35.23 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.04 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.19 
   -11.28 -11.49 -11.65 -11.79 -11.93 
surplus 1 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.64 
surplus 2 1.37 1.17 1.06 1.00 0.97 
 Overall 
  -0.13 -0.20 -0.28 -0.38 -0.51 
  -11.58 -11.80 -11.96 -12.10 -12.24 
  7.94 7.69 7.53 7.41 7.31 
surplus 1 6.94 6.80 6.68 6.55 6.42 
surplus 2 7.72 7.39 7.16 6.95 6.74 
Notes: The table shows results of the general model when we change the value of the bargaining 
share. We keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B11. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Bargaining  
Share in the Imperfect-Substitutes Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
                               
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.03 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.26 
    -15.04 -15.63 -16.07 -16.45 -16.81 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    4.37 9.20 17.20 35.38 152.77 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.27 -4.38 -4.51 -4.68 -4.90 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   35.25 35.34 35.49 35.69 35.97 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    0.39 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.17 
    -22.06 -22.04 -22.04 -22.05 -22.09 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    8.19 13.86 22.86 41.27 113.81 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -5.21 -5.50 -5.76 -6.05 -6.38 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   46.50 45.87 45.50 45.27 45.14 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 
   -15.85 -16.36 -16.74 -17.06 -17.39 
surplus 1 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.55 
surplus 2 2.34 1.94 1.69 1.52 1.40 
 Overall 
  -4.59 -4.73 -4.90 -5.09 -5.34 
  -16.18 -16.69 -17.07 -17.40 -17.73 
  4.78 4.34 4.05 3.83 3.65 
surplus 1 2.74 2.50 2.29 2.07 1.81 
surplus 2 4.33 3.74 3.30 2.91 2.51 
Notes: The table shows results of the model where immigrants and natives of the same type are 
imperfect substitutes in production when we change the value of the bargaining share. We keep all other 
parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
Table B12.  Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Bargaining 
 Share in the Separate-Markets Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
                               
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 
    -1.17 -1.24 -1.31 -1.38 -1.47 
      
    3.44 3.34 3.34 3.40 3.50 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -2.31 -2.46 -2.63 -2.84 -3.14 
    0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
      
    -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -5.00 -4.89 -4.86 -4.89 -4.97 
   -5.91 -6.05 -6.17 -6.29 -6.42 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 
    -0.38 -0.26 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 
      
    1.00 0.64 0.38 0.15 -0.05 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -3.10 -3.28 -3.49 -3.74 -4.11 
    0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
      
    -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.57 -6.41 -6.38 -6.42 -6.52 
   -7.65 -7.54 -7.43 -7.34 -7.25 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 
   -1.00 -1.03 -1.07 -1.12 -1.19 
surplus 1 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33 
surplus 2 0.69 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.53 
 Overall 
  -5.46 -5.33 -5.30 -5.33 -5.42 
  -6.41 -6.49 -6.57 -6.66 -6.76 
  3.91 3.62 3.45 3.33 3.23 
surplus 1 2.65 2.50 2.37 2.23 2.06 
surplus 2 3.51 3.12 2.85 2.60 2.36 
Notes: The table shows results of the model where immigrants and natives search in different labor 
markets when we change the value of the bargaining share. We keep all other parameter values the same 
(see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B13. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the  
Matching Elasticity in the General Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
                        
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.48 0.53 0.59 0.64 
    -2.13 -6.48 -11.00 -15.75 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    0.92 1.83 2.97 4.40 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.28 -0.20 -0.11 -0.01 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   22.34 22.80 23.36 24.05 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.69 -0.60 -0.48 -0.34 
    -3.35 -10.20 -17.26 -24.52 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -0.07 1.50 2.93 4.25 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.99 -1.63 -1.27 -0.90 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   34.33 34.82 35.29 35.77 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.03 0.09 0.15 0.21 
   -2.33 -7.02 -11.79 -16.71 
surplus 1 0.39 0.48 0.60 0.73 
surplus 2 0.46 0.71 1.00 1.34 
 Overall 
  -0.73 -0.56 -0.38 -0.21 
  -2.55 -7.29 -12.10 -17.05 
  6.94 7.16 7.41 7.71 
surplus 1 6.12 6.33 6.55 6.80 
surplus 2 6.17 6.54 6.95 7.42 
Notes: The table shows result of the general model when we change the value of 
the matching elasticity parameter. We keep all other parameter values the same 
(see Table 1). 
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Table B14. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Matching  
Elasticity in the Imperfect-Substitutes Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
                        
  Unskilled Natives 
    0.30 0.27 0.21 0.10 
    -3.22 -9.74 -16.45 -23.51 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -0.72 9.00 35.38 393.29 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.54 -4.60 -4.68 -4.77 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   33.94 34.65 35.69 37.29 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.11 0.00 0.20 0.55 
    -4.24 -12.96 -22.05 -31.68 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    0.23 19.48 41.27 68.91 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -7.10 -6.63 -6.05 -5.29 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
   43.54 44.33 45.27 46.45 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 
   -3.39 -10.17 -17.06 -24.24 
surplus 1 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.60 
surplus 2 0.58 0.96 1.52 2.36 
 Overall 
  -5.33 -5.21 -5.09 -4.96 
  -3.61 -10.46 -17.40 -24.62 
  2.89 3.28 3.83 4.65 
surplus 1 1.78 1.91 2.07 2.27 
surplus 2 1.72 2.21 2.91 3.92 
Notes: The table shows result of the model where immigrants and natives of the same 
type are imperfect substitutes in production when we change the value of the matching 
elasticity parameter. We keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B15. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Matching 
Elasticity in the Separate-Markets Model  
 
(Percentage Changes) 
  
                        
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.29 0.26 0.23 0.22 
    -0.37 -0.98 -1.38 -1.93 
    3.95 3.64 3.40 4.25 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -3.22 -3.00 -2.84 -2.64 
    0.02 0.06 0.11 0.15 
    -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.52 -4.61 -4.89 -5.65 
   -1.99 -4.73 -6.29 -7.46 
     
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.12 -0.07 0.01 0.08 
    0.16 0.32 -0.07 -1.35 
     
    -1.68 -1.12 0.15 2.67 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -6.60 -4.63 -3.74 -3.22 
    0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 
     
    -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 
 Overall Skilled 
   -7.00 -6.56 -6.42 -7.00 
   -2.51 -5.55 -7.34 -9.17 
     
 Overall Natives 
   0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 
   -0.28 -0.75 -1.12 -1.80 
surplus 1 0.39 0.34 0.31 0.30 
surplus 2 0.42 0.42 0.54 1.20 
 Overall 
  -5.27 -5.19 -5.33 -6.03 
  -2.28 -5.08 -6.66 -7.95 
  2.80 2.97 3.33 4.57 
surplus 1 1.85 2.06 2.23 2.39 
surplus 2 1.71 2.09 2.60 3.92 
Notes: The table shows result of the model where immigrants and natives search in 
different labor markets when we change the value of the matching elasticity 
parameter. We keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B16. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Unemployment 
 Income of the Unskilled Workers in the General Model 
 
(Percentage Changes) 
                                       
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.72 0.67 0.62 0.59 0.44 
    -6.86 -8.69 -10.04 -11.00 -14.48 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    1.96 2.38 2.72 2.97 3.95 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   0.08 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 -0.27 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   14.37 18.33 21.24 23.36 31.02 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.61 -0.56 -0.51 -0.48 -0.35 
    -17.14 -17.19 -17.23 -17.26 -17.36 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    2.72 2.81 2.88 2.93 3.13 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.40 -1.34 -1.30 -1.27 -1.14 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   35.04 35.15 35.23 35.29 35.50 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.07 
   -8.45 -9.88 -10.98 -11.79 -14.80 
surplus 1 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.52 
surplus 2 0.81 0.89 0.95 1.00 1.18 
 Overall 
  -0.27 -0.32 -0.36 -0.38 -0.47 
  -8.71 -10.17 -11.28 -12.10 -15.13 
  7.20 7.28 7.36 7.41 7.63 
surplus 1 6.65 6.61 6.58 6.55 6.47 
surplus 2 6.80 6.86 6.91 6.95 7.13 
Notes: The table shows result of the general model when we change the unemployment income of the 
unskilled workers. We keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B17.  Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Unemployment Income 
 of the Unskilled Workers in the Imperfect-Substitutes Model 
 
 (Percentage Changes) 
                                       
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.63 0.50 0.35 0.21 0.06 
    -7.85 -11.12 -14.01 -16.45 -18.89 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    7.06 14.79 24.41 35.38 50.31 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.29 -4.43 -4.56 -4.68 -4.80 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   16.60 23.75 30.20 35.69 41.27 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.13 -0.02 0.09 0.20 0.32 
    -21.75 -21.86 -21.97 -22.05 -22.14 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    37.55 38.94 40.19 41.27 42.40 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.39 -6.28 -6.16 -6.05 -5.92 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   44.64 44.88 45.09 45.27 45.46 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.34 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.05 
   -9.98 -12.53 -14.95 -17.06 -19.23 
surplus 1 0.74 0.67 0.59 0.51 0.42 
surplus 2 1.05 1.21 1.37 1.52 1.68 
 Overall 
  -4.89 -4.96 -5.03 -5.09 -5.15 
  -10.25 -12.84 -15.28 -17.40 -19.58 
  3.24 3.44 3.64 3.83 4.04 
surplus 1 2.19 2.17 2.12 2.07 2.00 
surplus 2 2.41 2.57 2.74 2.91 3.09 
Notes: The table shows result of the model where immigrants and natives of the same type are imperfect 
substitutes in production when we change the unemployment income of the unskilled workers. We keep 
all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B18.   Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Unemployment Income 
 of the Unskilled Workers in the Separate-Markets Model  
 
(Percentage Changes) 
                                       
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.33 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.16 
    -0.25 -0.47 -0.84 -1.38 -2.33 
      
    0.53 1.05 1.94 3.40 6.52 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -2.89 -2.83 -2.82 -2.84 -2.86 
    0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 
      
    -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.31 -4.43 -4.61 -4.89 -5.44 
   -3.61 -4.49 -5.35 -6.29 -7.60 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.15 -0.12 -0.07 0.01 0.13 
    0.84 0.74 0.51 -0.07 -2.20 
      
    -1.86 -1.65 -1.14 0.15 5.25 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -3.92 -3.89 -3.84 -3.74 -3.57 
    0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
      
    -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 
 Overall Skilled 
   -6.39 -6.40 -6.41 -6.42 -6.53 
   -6.23 -6.38 -6.67 -7.34 -9.65 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 
   0.12 -0.14 -0.53 -1.12 -2.31 
surplus 1 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 
surplus 2 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.54 1.09 
 Overall 
  -4.86 -4.96 -5.11 -5.33 -5.78 
  -4.37 -5.02 -5.75 -6.66 -8.17 
  2.88 2.95 3.08 3.33 4.09 
surplus 1 2.22 2.24 2.24 2.23 2.21 
surplus 2 2.23 2.29 2.39 2.60 3.31 
Notes: The table shows result of the model where immigrants and natives search in different labor 
markets when we change the unemployment income of the unskilled workers. We keep all other 
parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B19. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Unemployment Income 
of the Skilled Workers in the General Model 
(Percentage Changes) 
                                        
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 
    -10.97 -10.99 -11.00 -11.00 -11.01 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    2.92 2.95 2.96 2.97 2.98 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   23.29 23.33 23.34 23.36 23.38 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    -0.37 -0.42 -0.45 -0.48 -0.52 
    -13.25 -15.41 -16.29 -17.26 -18.40 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    1.91 2.44 2.67 2.93 3.24 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -1.15 -1.21 -1.24 -1.27 -1.30 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   27.02 31.47 33.29 35.29 37.66 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 
   -11.23 -11.52 -11.65 -11.79 -11.97 
surplus 1 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.58 
surplus 2 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01 
 Overall 
  -0.37 -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 -0.39 
  -11.56 -11.84 -11.96 -12.10 -12.27 
  7.36 7.39 7.40 7.41 7.43 
surplus 1 6.59 6.57 6.56 6.55 6.54 
surplus 2 6.92 6.93 6.94 6.95 6.96 
Notes: The table shows result of the general model when we change the unemployment income of the 
skilled workers. We keep all other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B20.  Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Unemployment Income 
of the Skilled Workers in the Imperfect-Substitutes Model  
 
(Percentage Changes) 
                                        
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.16 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.23 
    -16.36 -16.41 -16.42 -16.45 -16.47 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    34.72 35.06 35.21 35.38 35.60 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.73 -4.70 -4.69 -4.68 -4.66 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   35.51 35.61 35.65 35.69 35.75 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    0.48 0.35 0.28 0.20 0.10 
    -15.62 -18.95 -20.40 -22.05 -24.10 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    18.87 28.94 34.29 41.27 51.55 
    same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
 Overall Skilled 
   -5.85 -5.95 -5.99 -6.05 -6.11 
   same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
      
   31.93 38.82 41.84 45.27 49.54 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 
   -16.29 -16.67 -16.85 -17.06 -17.35 
surplus 1 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.51 0.46 
surplus 2 1.49 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.53 
 Overall 
  -5.07 -5.08 -5.09 -5.09 -5.10 
  -16.65 -17.02 -17.19 -17.40 -17.68 
  3.73 3.78 3.80 3.83 3.86 
surplus 1 2.14 2.11 2.09 2.07 2.04 
surplus 2 2.84 2.87 2.89 2.91 2.93 
Notes: The table shows result of the model where immigrants and natives of the same type are imperfect 
substitutes in production when we change the unemployment income of the skilled workers. We keep all 
other parameter values the same (see Table 1). 
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Table B21.   Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Unemployment Income 
of the Skilled Workers in the Separate-Markets Model 
  
(Percentage Changes) 
                                        
 Unskilled Natives 
    0.20 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.25 
    -1.04 -1.11 -1.18 -1.38 -2.37 
      
    2.50 2.70 2.88 3.40 6.21 
 Unskilled Immigrants 
    -2.87 -2.86 -2.86 -2.84 -2.81 
    0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 
      
    -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21 
 Overall Unskilled 
   -4.84 -4.85 -4.86 -4.89 -5.12 
   -5.86 -5.95 -6.04 -6.29 -7.49 
      
 Skilled Natives 
    0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 
    -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 0.25 
      
    0.09 0.16 0.21 0.15 -0.72 
 Skilled Immigrants 
    -3.77 -3.75 -3.74 -3.74 -3.70 
    0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
      
    -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 
 Overall Skilled 
   -5.94 -6.05 -6.15 -6.42 -7.63 
   -5.82 -6.56 -6.93 -7.34 -7.48 
      
 Overall Natives 
   0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06 
   -0.96 -1.00 -1.03 -1.12 -1.53 
surplus 1 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 
surplus 2 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.79 
 Overall 
  -5.17 -5.21 -5.24 -5.33 -5.79 
  -6.25 -6.35 -6.44 -6.66 -7.41 
  3.13 3.18 3.22 3.33 3.91 
surplus 1 2.22 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.22 
surplus 2 2.45 2.48 2.51 2.60 3.10 
Notes: The table shows result of the model where immigrants and natives search in different labor 
markets when we change the unemployment income of the skilled workers. We keep all other parameter 
values the same (see Table 1). 
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Figure C1. Dynamic Adjustment 
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